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PREFACE
st. Thomas Aquinas himself would be the first to insist now, as he did
in a_ well-known passage, that the purpose of the study of philosophy is not
to learn what opinions men have held, but what is the truth about reality.l
Nevertheless, as a matter of actual tact it is a great help toward attaining
the truth to be able to take advantage of the accumulated philosophical experience of mankind, and particularly of the recorded statements of the admittedly great thinkers of the remote and recent past.

So true is this that,

if the fact be noted, in a great many philosophical discussions, when we attempt to solve a problem about reality we find it advisable and even necessary to avail ourselves of the added help afforded by such thinkers as Aristotle or st. Thomas.
totle say?

But immediately the problem becomes, just what did Aris•

or, just what did Aquinas mean when he said this or that?

Con-

sequently, any work which will facilitate our study of the meaning of St.
Thomas' philosophical language will be a great help ultimately in our pursuit
of the truth about things, that is, of philosophy itself.
The existence of many works testifies to this fact.

Not a few men have

thought it worth their while to compile some sort of lexicon or

glossa~y

of

the terminology of philosophical writers, especially that of St. Thomas.
Most notable, perhaps, is that of Dr. Ludwig Schatz, whose Thomas-Lexicon
was compiled first from the two Summas and later from the other works of st.
lrn De Coelo et Mundo I, lect.22.
iii

iT

Thomas. 2 Whatever be its excellence in comparison with the present offering,
it has the disadvantage of being in German, besides being ill-adapted for
comparative study between the terminology of the different works of St.
Thomas and study of chronological development in the use of terms such as is
afforded by dictionaries prepared from individual works, and lastly it oannot
hope to account for every occurrence of a ter.m as does the present work.
great Du Gange Glossarium

Mediae~

The

!nfimae Latinitatis is of little value to

students of St. Thomas, for it practically ignores him.

Other works, such as

N. Signoriello, Lexicon Peripateticum Philosophico-Theologicum,3 and George
Reeb, S.J., Thesaurus Philosophorum,4 treat of axioms and distinctions rather
than of the precise meaning of terms.

Moreover, the last three mentioned all

include other writers than St. Thomas and hence are not truly representative
of his characteristic terminology.

Similar difficulties occur in connection

with such works as that of Jos. Zama Mellinio, Lexicon Scholasticorum
Verborum,5 and the various lists in the edition of the Summa Theologica
edited by Xavier Faucher, o.p.6

There are a few other glossaries prepared

for certain other works of St. Thomas, but nothing

on~

Veritate

~

Since none of the above-mentioned works is in English, they are of

litt~

22nd. ed., Ferdinand SohCningh, Paderborn, 1895, x-889 PP•
3Bibl. Cath. Script., Neapoli, 1893, 423 PP•
4weger, Brixinae, 1871, 421 PP•
5s. Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica, 1~rietti, Taurini, 1928 (not in earlieditions), VI, "ex editione Patavina, 1712."

er

6Editio Altera, Lethielleux, 1924,

v.

v

use to a large number of American students interested in st. Thomas.

There

is in preparation at the present time in another American university a glossary of the complete works of St. Thomas.

This will lack the advantages of

dictionaries for each separate work, as discussed above, and involves a dif•
ferent procedure than that used in the preparation of this work.

Further-

more, since it is being undertaken by the classics department of that univarsity, it would seem to be linguistic rather than philosophical.

It is im-

possible to settle the precise meaning of st. Thomas' terms on linguistic
grounds alone, since the precise meaning of each term depends on the philosophical context and hence requires such knowledge of the philosophy of St.
Thomas as will make the contextx clear.

Moreover, a knowledge of the history

of medieval philosophy can be shown to be very important in the preparation
of such a glossary.
There is only one translation of

E! Veritate!

published in English.7

The small glossary at the end of that volume is not only not confined to the
language of St. Thomas, but the poor rendering of many of the terms in the
translation makes it suspect; to give but two examples, "comparatio" is
translated "comparison"8 when the obvious meaning is "relation," and "pertingit ad" is translat.ed "pertains to"9 when the obvious meaning is "arrives
at" or "attains to."
7Richard McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, Scribner's, New York,
1930, II, 159-234.
8
.
~·· 182.
9 Ibid., 232.

The burden of this present undertaking, then, was to develop a technique
for the detailed study of st. Thomas' use of philosophical terms in a given
work, and to apply it to the first of his Quaestiones Disputatae

~

Veritate.

The results of this task are presented in the for.m of a dictionary in which
is laid dow.n the meaning of same 321 terms as used by St. Thomas in that work.
with appropriate comments as occasioned.

(It will be seen that almost any

one of these words could form the subject of a research task of doctorate
proportions.). The chief values of the procedure used are that every occurrence of the word being studied is accounted for, and the exclusive use of
just one work of St. Thomas makes the present work of value to later students
who may wish to do comparative study either with other works of St. Thomas or
with later scholastic terminology.
Although the use of the term in other works of St. Thomas as well as the
works of subsequent philosophers and critics have been taken into account and
occasionally noted, the primary source of information has been, in keeping
with the foregoing comments and criticisms, the context of De Veritate I itself with reference to the exact thought of st. Thomas as developed in that
work.

That such intensive attention to a philosophical text, not from the

view-point of textual criticism or paleography or linguistics but with the
primary aim of philosophical meaning always in view, has been of real profit
to a student of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas can be put dow.n as a
matter of recorded fact.
Sincere acknowledgment is due to the Rev. John J. Wellmuth, s.J., chair-

rti
man of the Philosophy Department of Loyola University, whose help and guidance at every stage of this work have been invaluable.

I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE DE VERITATE

CHAPTER

I

CIRCUMSTANCES AND DATE OF ITS COMPOSITION
Henry Denifle, O.P., the great authority on documentary sources for the
history of the University of Paris during the time of st. Thomas Aquinas,
makes the remark in a note in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensisl
that the old lives of St. Thomas agree about one date if about nothing else:
st. Thomas was made a magister in theology at the University of Paris in the
year 1256.

This is important, because it clinches beyond all doubt the

dating of the Quaestiones Disputatae

~

Veritate.

For biographers, histori-

ans, and critical scholars are in unanimous agreement that the work was the
fruit of his first years of teaching at the University of Paris, immediately
after he was advanced to the magisterium.
The oldest sources for the life of St. Thomas are in remarkable agreement on the facts of these years of st. Thomas's life and work.

A study of

the writings of William of Tocco, Bernard Guido, and Peter Calo reveals that
St. Thomas was made licentiate in theology in the early months of 1256, and
master later in that same year.2

Bartholomew, or Ptolemy, or Tolomey, of

1Henrious Denifle, O.P., et Aemilio Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis
Parisiensis, Delalain, Paris, 1889, I, 307, note 1.
2Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundgriss der Gesohichte ~ Philosophie (rev. Bernhard Geyer), Yittler & Son, Berlin, 1928, II, 423. An excellent bibliography on the life of St. Thomas Aquinas is contained in P. Mandonnet, O.P.,
and J. Destrez, O.P., Bibliographie Thomiste (Biblioth~que Thomiste, I), Le
Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1921, 1-1. More recent is that in P. A. Walz,
O.P., "Chronotaxis Vitae et Operum s. Thomae de Aquino," Angelicum, 1939,
XVI, 463-473. The Bollandists list the old sources and reproduce many of
them., Acta Sanctorum: :Martii, I, 655-657.
1

2

Lucca was a disciple or st. Thomas and a church historian who died in the
year 1327.

In his life of St. Thomas he says, "Post hoc, ipso magistrato,

fecit Questiones de Veritate.
am ••• n3

Post tres annos magisterii sui redit in Itali-

Another early biographer, Bartholomew of Capua (Logotheta), a Sicili-

an who as a student followed the lectures of St. Thomas, dates the De Verita~

as being written after St. Thomas was made master and during his first

period of teaching· at Paris, before going to Italy in 1259. 4

The English

Dominican Nicholas Trevet, who died in 1328, made a catalogue of the works or
st. Thomas between the years 1319 and 1323, in which he notes that St. Thomas
"scripsit etiam primam partem de Quaestionibus disputatis de Veritate et
~ltra, quas Parisiis disputavit."5

The older historians, following these sources, tell us that the young
Thomas came to Paris ·in 1252 from the school of Albert the Great at Cologne,
and spent the years 1252-1256 as a bachelor in theology in Paris.

Although

they agree that he was made master in 1256, there seems to be good evidence
that the formal inceptio by which he was recognized as a master by the faculty
of the University of Paris did not take place until October, 1257.

This is

the opinion of J. Echard in his life of st. Thomas,6 of the church historian
3Fide Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., Des Eorits Authentiques de S. Thomas d 1 Aquin
(2me edition), Saint-Paul, Fribourg, 1910, 59.
--

~Alexander Birkenmajer, "Kleinere Thomasfragen," Phi1osophisches Jahrbuch,
1921, XXXIV, 32.
~la.ndonnet, ~ Ecrits Authentiques, 47-48.
6Echard-Quetif (Bibliothecae Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum, Paris, 1719-

1721, I, ad annum 1274),
1775, I, ix-xxv.

!! Thomae

Aquinatis Opera, Simon Occhi, Venetiis,

Fleury, of John Francis Bernard Maria de Rubeis, O.P.,7 and of Ueberweg.a
Since all agree that he left for Italy in 1259, Quaestio! of the
was almost certainly written in 1257.

The editors of the

Viv~s

De

Veritate

edition, how-

ever, say "1257 Parisiis ••• Laurea donatus, ab anno 1258 ad annum sequentem
Questiones de Veritate ••• scripsit."9

(The fact mentioned by the Bollandists

in the~ Sanctorum,lO that St. Thomas was made doctor of theology in the
year 1253, must not be confused with his being made magister at the

Universi~

of Paris, for the doctorate was always previous even to the licentiate in
those days, and in this case was probably granted by the Dominican Order
rather than by the University.)
The most recent investigations confir-m these conclusions.

Dr. Martin

Grabmann in his Thomas ~ Aquinll states that st. Thomas received his licentiate in 1256 and left Paris in 1259, and in his latest work on Die Werke des
~ Thomas ~ Aquinl2 he makes these the outside dates for the writing of

the De Veritate.

Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., in the latest expression of his

mind on the subject dates the De Veritate I as somewhere in the year 1256-

7Dissertationes Criticae etc. (Pasquali, Venetiis, 1750, Dissertatio XI,
caput ii), ~ Thomae Aquinatis Opera (ed. Leonina), Ramae, 1882, I, clxxv.
8

0p.

~·

424.

9opera Omnia s. Thamae Aquinatis (ed. Stanislaus Edward Frett~ et Paul Mar~),
Apud Ludovicum Viv~s, Paris, 1871, I, xii.
1

~tii, I, "Cammentarius praevius," 657b.

llF. Pustet, M«nchen, 1926, 3-5.
12Aschendorff, ~~star, 1931, 276, 280.

4

1257.13 A most recent summary (1939) of the investigations on the subject
lays down the following chronology:l4
1252-1256
1256
1257
1259

Parisiis, Baccalaureus
Obtenta licentia, fit magister in theologia
a collegiis magister agnoscitur
in Italiwm rediit.

and states that the disputed questions

E!

Veritate date at the outside fram

1256 to 1259.15 From all this we gather that it is quite safe to assign the
year 1257 as the extremely probable date for the first question. for it is
certain that St. Thomas was at work on them by that time and it is highly
probable that he at least did not progress very far during 1256.
It must be noted that the controversies which raged for some time in
the various European learned periodicals between Grabmann, J. Koch, Mandonnet,
P. Synave. O.P., and others regarding the chronology of the disputed ques-

tions does not touch the date of the

E!

Veritate at all, but centers rather

around the dating of De .Anima, .£!_ Spiritualibus Creaturis, and _E! Unione
Verbi Inoarnati.

A good idea of these discussions can be obtained from the

reviews in the Bulletin Thomiste for 1924 and 1926.16

All the authorities,

as well as all of the old catalogues, especially two "book lists" of the

13s. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, Lethielleux, Paris, 1925, "Introduction," I, 19. He here summarizes his "Chronologie des questions disputees de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thamiste, 1918, XXIII, 266-287,
341-371.
14walz, ~ ~~ 470.

15 Ibid.
16Bu1letin Thomiste, 1924, I, 58-61; 1926, III, 1-21 especially.

5

University of Paris dating fr~ 1275-1286 and 1292-1294 respeotively,l7 assurE
us that the De Veritate is the first of the disputed questions of St. Thomas.
The historical facts being established, it remains to interpret them in
ter.ms of their setting.

The

~

Veritate represents the work of St. Thomas

during a relatively early period in his productive career.

But he was by

this time no novice in the realm of philosophy and theology.

He had been

commenting on Peter the Lombard's books of Sentences since 1252 and had
mitted the fruits of this teaching to writing.
eight small philosophical works, including

He had composed

the~~

s~e

c~-

seven or

et Essentia •. He was

by then a veteran of the battle which grew out of the antagonism which the
secular clergy and laity of the University of Paris had shown toward the new
Order of Preachers; as his own share in the controversy he had contributed
the Contra Impugnantes

~

Amour condemned and his

own

Cultum _!! Religionem.

Now With William of St.

Order vindicated by the Pope,l8 Aquinas began to

teach as a master of theology in one of the two Dominican colleges which by
that time had been incorporated into the University of Paris.
This meant a very active engagement in the public scholastic life of
that violently intellectual atmosphere.

For in the Paris of that day school

meant more than dull classroom routine.

In the twelfth century a question

arising out of the interpretation of scripture or

s~e

author, usually Peter

the Lombard, had formed the basis of the lecture of the master.

This easily

17Denifle-Chatelain, Chart, Univ. Paris., I, 646.
18 J. Echard, Vita Santi Thomae, uses the expression, "Paoatis tandem rebus
laurea donatus questiones de veritate disputavit ••• " ~~, x.

6

turned into a discussion or dispute.

The dispute finally detached itself

from the lesson and became a separate exercise in its own right, being known
as the "ordinary disputation."

Every master in theology at Paris had to put

on several of these ordinary disputations a year.

According to Mandonnet and

synave St. Thomas held them as often as twice a week.

Pelsterl9 and Birken-

majer20 disagree with the methods used to arrive at that conclusion, but
only, it would seem, in order to dispute about the chronology of some of the
later Quaestiones Disputatae.

At any rate, he certainly held them oftener

than a few times a year.
The subject was fixed in advance, and was usually confined to a single
topic although more than one might be discussed if they were related.
the classes of the other bachelors and masters

ce~sed

All

for that morning, and

we may imagine with what curiosity they flocked to the disputation hall of
the brilliant young disciple of the Aristotelian Albert, already making a
name for himself.

At this session, however, the magister only presided; he

might summarize and otherwise help, but the bachelors did the arguing.

The

next day, or the first day on which nothing prevented, there followed the
magisterial "determination," the formal recapitulation and pronouncement of
the master upon the subject of the previous disputation.

Bachelors could

not "determine," this being the sole right of the master, though the preliminary arguments which he presented were usually those proposed by the

19 F. Pelster, S.J., review of P. Synave, o.P., "Le Probl~e chronologique des
questions disputees de s. Thomas d 1 Aguin," Scholastik, 1926, I, 587-590.
20 o

·t
36-45 •
...F.!. 2.::....!..'

. I"""

7

bachelors the day before.

The Quaestiones Disputatae as we have them are the

written for.m, then, not of the disputation but of the deter.minatio of the
master.21

Each article of the present for.m represents one such determination

We possess 510 of these written by St. Thomas, of which 253 are under the
general title

E!

Veritate, though only twelve are included under the first

question which really forms the treatise bearing that name.
These disputations with their magisterial determinations gave st. Thomas
a chance to work out at great length and in a controversial atmosphere much
of what he was later to set forth more positively and succinctly in the two
summas.

They do not, it is true, represent his best period, namely that from

1268 (when he got hold of certain material in translation from the Greek)
until his death in 1274.

Yet they do form an important part of his writings,

being often his fullest treatment of a topic.

The De Veritate shows a de-

cisiveness and a fir.mness of touch not observed in the commentaries on the
Sentences.

The problems essayed are difficult, the manner of their treatment

profound and skillful.

Since in them historical background is more prominent

than in the Summa Theologica, they reflect better the doctrinal milieu in
which he was working.

The significance of this will come to fuller light in

Chapter V of this introduction.
21Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Euro~e in the Middle Ages (new ed.,
rev. F. M. Pawicke):-Glarendon Press-;-Oi.for , !9'36;-I, 49o-4"96T"'Mandonnet,
Quaestiones Disputatae, "Introduction," I, 8-15.

CHAPTER II

AUTHENTICITY OF THE WORK
As might be sur.mised from the foregoing chapter, the authenticity of the
De Veritate

!

is beyond all dispute.

It is attested by the unanimity and

forthright nature of the assertions of all the early chroniclers of St.
Thomas's life and of all the early cataloguers of his works.

A recent and

thorough study by Jean A. Destrez, O.P., "La Texte de la Question Disput'e
•De Veritate' de Saint Thomas d'apr~s la tradition manuscrite"l assures us
that the authenticity of this work is unquestionable, whether one examines
the extant manuscripts of the text or the codices containing the old catalogues.

Mandonnet in 1910 in his Des Ecrits Authentiques had quoted the

catalogues of Nicholas Trevet, Ptolemy of Lucca, Bernard Guido, and the socalled "official" catalogue of the year 1319 (MSS. 3112 and 3113 lat., Biblio•
th~que

nationale de Paris), and had declared that all the thirteen catalogues

listed by him2 leave no doubt as to the authenticity of theE! Veritate

!•

An old price list of works sold by a stationer in Paris at prices fixed by

the masters of the University in the years 1275-1286 gives us precise information about such details as the number of its pages and the price.3
1Etudes Critiques sur las Oeuvres de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Biblioth~que
Thomiste, XVIII),-r6 Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1933, 33-160.
2op. ~· 106.

Cf. also J. Koch,~~~ 361-362.

3Denifle-Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., I, 646.
8

The

9

Bollandists quote Wi~liam of Tocco quite definitely on the point, 4
Rubeis is no less certain.S

and De

Birkenmajer assures us that the controversies

between von blichelitsch and Grabmann on the "official" catalogue in no way
involve the~ Veritate.6. More recently, Synave has made a new study of this
catalogue in comparison with others and confirmed our assurance as to the
authenticity of the De Veritate,7 whatever question it may occasion concerning other works.

Fr. Pelster, S.J., reported in 1929 that he had found an autograph
of the De Veritate (Vat. lat. 781).8

1~.

This would put it along with one half

of the Summa Contra Gentiles and parts of the commentaries on Boethius and
Isaias in that very privileged group of works which we have in St. Thomas's
own hand.

Fr. Destrez, however, expressed rather strongly in 1933 his

opinion that it was not an autograph, though it is evidently not in the hand
of a professional copyist.

He conjectures that it is probably that of' some

student of the time of St. Thomas or shortly after.9
4vita Sancti Thomae., caput iv, n. 18, Acta Sanctorum:

Martii, I, 665a.

Sop. cit., Dissertatio XI, caput i, clxxiv; Dissertatio II, caput i, lxxvi'Ii'Xix.6 Op.

~~

32, note 6.

711 Le catalogue oi'i'iciel des oeuvres de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale ~ litt~raire du moyen 1ge, 1928., III, 25-103, esp. ~5-86.
8 "Beitrfge zur Chronologie der Quodlibets der Hl. Thomas von Aquin," Gregorianum, 1929, X, 60-61.

-

9"Le Texte de la Question Disputee 'De Veritate' •••: 105, note 2.

~

-~------------------------------------------------------------------.

CHAPTER
THE TEXT:

PRINCIPAL EDITIONS

The text of the first question of
difficulty.

~estrez,

III

the~

Veritate does not present great

in his work on the text of the De Veritate referred to

in the last chapter, reports that there are 66 extant manuscripts.

He lists

them on pages 106-140, giving a full description and the location of each.
They are deposited in universities and libraries all over Europe and date
from the late thirteenth century on.
66.

He has personally examined 48 of the

He traces very carefully the history of the manuscript sources for the

earliest printed editions of the work, and especially the Roman, or Pian,
edition of 1570 from which all later ones stem.

A summary criticism of his

method of exemplaria and peciae and the reception which it got among reviewers, as well as ample references to the pertinent literature on the question,
can be found in the Preface to the new Ottawa edition of the Summa. 1

Since

any actual consultation of the manuscripts is out of the question for the
present, and since the results of his investigations bring no important
changes to the part of the text involved in this work, the question is not as
important here as the survey of what texts are actually available in this
country.
In order to establish as sound as possible a text from which to elaborate
1s. Thomae de Aquino Summa Theologiae (ed. Instituti Studiorum Medievalium
ottaviensiSJ, Stud. ~en. 0. Pr., Ottawa, 1941, I, viii-x.
10

11

the dictionary, avery available edition was carefully checked for possible
variant readings, as follows.
1.

Divi Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici,

~~

Opera Omnia,

Gratiis privilegiisque Pii V Pont. Max. typis excusa, ad. Vincentius Justinianus et Thomas Manriques {the title page has
!~rriques,

but this is probably a typographical error as Man-

riques appears three distinct times on p. vii), Apud Julium
Accoltum, Romae 1570, 17 vols. in folio {some catalogues say
18, but the copy examined had only 17 and it is so listed in
the Prefaces to the
De Veritate

!

Viv~s

and Parma editions).

is found in vol. XIII, pages 289-296 (each

number represents four folio columns, as every other page is
numbered).

In article five it reads "ad sextum dicendum"

where all the others read "ad sextum et septimum dicendum,"
with the result that the reply to the eighth argument is entitled "ad septimum" and so forth for the rest of the article.
2.

Divi Thomae Aquinatis ••• Opera, aditio altera Veneta, cudebat

Simon Occhi, Venetiis, 1775-1788, 28 vols. in quarto.

Contains

the Life of St. Thomas by Echard and the Dissertationes Criticae
of Jo. Fr. Bernard Maria De Rubeis.

This edition seems to be

identical with that brought out apud Jos. Bettinelli, Venetiis,
1745-1788.

This opinion is based on the absolute similarity of

paper, format, and printing, and upon the fact that in those days

~------------------------------------------.
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such undertakings occasionally changed hands when one printer died
or sold out.
De Veritate I is contained in volume XVI (1784), pages 124-147.
3.

s.

Thomas AqUinatis Opera Omnia, ad. Joannes Maria Allodi,

typis Petri Fiaccadori, Parmae, 1852-1873, 25 vol. in small folio.
De Veritate I is in volume IX (1859), pages 5-22.
4. ~ Thamae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, ad. Stanislaus Edward Frett~
at Paul

Mar~,

apud Ludovioum

Viv~s,

Parisiis, 1871-1880, 34 vo1.

in small folio.
De Veritate I is in volume XIV (1875), pages 315-341.
5.

~

Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae ad fidam optimarum

editionum diligenter recusae, sumptibus P. Lethie11eux, Parisiis,
1884, 3 vols. in 12 mo.

This edition is the same, except in arrange-

ment of questions, as the following.
6.

~

Thamae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae ad fidem optimarum

editionum diligenter reousae, Nova aditio amandata et

augment~e

d'une Preface par le R. P. Mandonnet, O.P. (sic), sumptibus P.
Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1925.
De Veritate I is in the first of the three 12 mo. volumes,
pages 1-30.
7.

~

Thamae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, aditio quinta

~-------------------------------~
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Taurinensis, Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1927, 5 volumes in octavo.
~

Veritate l i s here numbered Question XI {i.e., of all the

disputed questions) and occupies pages 1-26 of volume III.
Thus every available edition of the

~

Veritate was examined; there are

also extant those versions of the 1750 Roman edition printed at Venice in
1592-1594, at Antwerp in 1612, and at Paris in 1636-1641 and 1660,2 and a few
editions mentioned by Ueberweg {~~~ P• 422).
In only three places has there been sufficient difference in the readings
to demand recognition in the construction of the dictionary itself.
will be discussed below.

These

Some very minor and insignificant variations serve

as clues to trace the relations between the various editions.

Many of these

editions state bluntly that they are based on the Roman edition of 1570.
Examination of the others revealed that they likewise stemmed fram it.

Un-

fortunately, the editors of many of the editions keep it a dark secret upon
what they based their text and how they emended it--"idam tenet silentium
altissimum," as we find the Ottawa editors saying.3
The Venice edition of 1784 is based directly on the Roman edition, having only three minor, variants.

John Mary Allodi, the editor of the Parma

edition, tells us that except for a few certain works, not including
Veri tate,
Pro aliis vero operibus universis adhibuimus
2Listed in the Viv~s edition, I, xviii.
3summa Theologiae, I, xix-xx.

the~

,.--------------------,
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Romanam, jussu s. Pii V Pont. Max. excusam, an. 1570.
XVII voll. in fol., et Venetam apud Bettinelli cum illustrationibus P. Bernardi Mariae de Rubeis an. 1745.
28 voll. in 4to.4
The Parma edition does have minor variations in six places, three of which
are the same as those of the Venice edition.
1884, the

1~donnet

The Lethielleux edition of

edition, which is admitted to simply reproduce it, and

the Marietti edition all follow the Parma edition exactly.

The

Viv~s

edition

is the only one of the six to vary at all notably from the Roman edition.
The editors state that they have used the Parma text but checked it against
tour MSS. of the

Biblioth~que

nationals de Paris and adopted variant readings

from them when they seemed justified.s

The fact that they strangely fail to

identify the four Paris codices used except as A, B, C, and D presents little
difficulty, for in the complete list of extant manuscripts which Destrez
prints, only four MSS. are listed as in the Biblioth~que nationals de Paris.6
Due, evidently, to the influence of this added textual source, the
edition varies in some fifteen minor places from the Roman.

Viv~s

In summary, the

relatively small number of discrepancies among the various editions, extremely

f~

of which are attributable to anything but unimportant and obvious

typographical errors, seams_to indicate that the text for at least Question
I is fundamentally sound.
Since the majority of the available editions followed the Raman edition
4 opera Omnia, Parma ed., 1852, I, xii.
5opera Omnia,

Viv~s

ed., 1871, I, xix.

611 Le texte de la question disput~e 'De Veritate'•••• It 124-126.
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quite faithfully, and especially since the Parma, Mandonnet-Lethielleux, and
Marietti editions agree exactly, it was thought practical to use the most
commonly available text, the Marietti, in the preparation of the dictionary,
and to refer to it in the manner which is customary in referring to the Bekker pages of Aristotle's works.

The Marietti differs from the Parma only in

one place, an obvious typographical error, rendering

11

sensun for "sensus" in

25a48 contrary to all six of the other editions examined.
As to the variant readings which seem of enough import to enter into
this work, they are all instances in which one or more of the Paris
by the

Viv~s

editions.

l~S.

used

editors give a different reading from that in any of the printed

In 4bl9 they read "personis" with codex B, in place of "personae";

correctly, it would seem, as noted under the word APPROPRIO in the dictionary,
infra.

In 2lal7 they read "aliquam" for "aliam" with all four of the codices

to support them, and in so doing confirm the conjecture of the Venice editors
in a

footnote~

loco, and copied by the Parma and Mandonnet editions in

similar footnotes; this reading is accepted, as noted under the word RECTITUDO, infra.

In 12bll the

Viv~s

editors again have all four codices as

grounds for inserting "quamdam," as against all the printed editions; the
manuscripts are probably correct because St. Thomas in similar contexts does
use the expression 11 adaequationem quamdam," e.g., in 3bll.

Lastly, in 2la35

they omit the word "exemplari" from the expression "de causa exemplari efficiente" with B, C, and D; this is no doubt correct, and the questionability
of the word in the printed editions is further revealed by the fact that in

~~------------------------------~
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this single instance the Roman edition varies from all others by having
"exemplaris," pointing to some corruption of the text because it makes no
sense at all in the passage.

~------------------------~

CHAPTER IV
OUTLINE OF ITS CONTENTS

The progression of ideas in the treatise is very deliberate.
made up of twelve articles of varying lengths.
the age-old question,
article.

~at

It is

St. Thomas begins by asking

is truth?" and proceeds to an5Wer it in the first

Here he is careful to keep unentangled from subsequent questions,

laying down the meaning of the bare notion of truth in its most basic and all
inclusive sense, "adaequatio rei et intellectus."

The preliminary arguments

consist largely of various definitions of truth taken from older philosophers
and in the body of the article, after explaining truth as a certain attribute
of being itself, he is at pains to accept these definitions in some sense or
other as agreeing with what he has said.

He does not use the modern scholas-

tic term "transcendental attribute," but he substantially conveys this idea,
and he does say that being and true are convertible.
Having settled the notion of truth in general, he goes on in article
two to refine more precisely the matter by asking

~ether

found chiefly in the intellect rather than in things?"

truth is to be

He answers that truth

is to be found as a primary and intrinsic analogue in the intellect, secondarily and by extrinsic denomination in things.

He does not usa the tar.ms

"logical" and "ontological truth."
In the third article he takes up the point made in the second article
that truth is primarily in the intellect, and asks in more detail "Whether
17

~-~----------------------------~
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truth is in the intellect compounding and dividing?" i.e., in the judging
intellect.

He an5Wers that it is more properly in the intellect combining

and separating, i.e., affirming and denying, than in the simple formation of
intellectual quiddities; still less properly is it said of things, and lastly
it is said of man who can speak truly or falsely.
Article four asks

'~ether

there is only one truth by which all things

are true?" and here for the first time a long series of preliminary arguments
fifteen in all, betrays the fact that he is on more controversial ground.
The reason, of course, is St. Augustine's persistent emphasis on the Divine
Truth.

But St. Thomas manages to preserve what is good in Augustine and fit

it in with his Aristotelianism by carefully distinguishing between truth in
the mind and truth in things, then subdistinguishing truth in the divine
mind from truth in the created mind, and likewise differentiating the truth
of things because of their relation of conformity to the divine mind from
their truth because of conformity or conformability to the created mind.

The

truth in the divine mind is one, of course, and the truth of any one thing is
one insofar as it is simply the entity of the thing itself; but there are as
many truths in created minds as there are created minds conformed to the
thing's entity.
Article five continues the discussion of matter important to the Augusti·
nians, as is shown by the number of arguments, twenty-four in number this
time, which precede the body of the article.

He asks

~ether

any other

truth is eternal besides the first truth?" and proceeds very surely upon the

r.----------------------------~
19
foundation he has alreadyBid for himself in previous articles.

The truth in

God's mind is of course eternal, and there is a sense in which the enuntiable
truth contained in a proposition is eternal, but truth in things and in
created minds is'not eternal.
In the sixth article he deals with a rather intricate point,
created truth is unchangeable?"

~Vhether

This requires many subtle distinctions.

Truth cannot be the subject of change; but things can change with regard to
it, in certain ways.

The truth of a thing with respect to the divine mind

cannot change into falsity when the thing is changed (any more than can the
truth of the divine mind itself), but only into another truth.

In relation

to the human mind, however, the truth of a thing changes into another truth
if the mind keeps pace with the change; but if the mind fails to change with
the thing, there is falsity.
Article seven takes up a purely theological question,
truth is predicated personally or essentially?"

~ether

in God

He dispatches it in short

order with the necessary distinctions between predicating attributes of the
divine Essence and appropriating them to a certain divine Person, and between
the proper use of the term "truth" in regard to God and the metaphorical use
of it in connection with the Person of the Word.
In article eight he returns to matter in which there is room for disagreement between him and anyone with Neoplatonic leanings, as the Augustinians were almost bound to be.
truth?"

He asks

'~ether

all truth is from the first

He answers that the truth of things, their being, must be from God,

~--------------~
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as imitations of His divine exemplarity.

He further placates the Neoplaton-

ists in his audience by saying that truth in the created intellect must also
be from God; but he avoids the illumination theory by giving as his reason
that truth is a good of the intellect, and all good is from God ultimately,
thus leaving open the possibility of an Aristotelian theory of cognition.
Article nine completes the positive treatment of truth by taking up the
question of its lowest possible mode of existence in a knower--mw.hether truth
is in the sensa?"

The article is deplorably short, considering the importan

attached to it nowadays.
not formally.

He answers that truth is properly in the sense, but

That is, sense knowledge can be true, but being incapable of

perfect reflection the sense cannot recognize its conformity with the object
which it truly knows; however, it does have a sort of imperfect reflection
by which it is conscious of its act.
The last three articles deal with the opposite of truth, namely falsity.
Here the order is ascending, the first step being taken in article ten with
the question

~ether

any thing is false?"

In the light of articles four,

five, and eight it is easy to reply that no thing can be false with respect
to God's intellect, nor consequently in its own being.

But because our human

knowledge is acquired through a multiple process beginning in the sense
knowledge of accidents and ending in the intellectual knowledge of essences,
material things can be called false in the sense that the discrepancy between
their sensory appearance and their internal nature may sometimes be the occasion for falsity in our minds.

rr-·--------------------~
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Article eleven continues the discussion of falsity with the question,
"Whether falsity is in the sense?"

The answer is that falsity can be said to

obtain in sense knowledge in two ways:

first, insofar as sensory impressions

are the occasion of falsity in the intellect; secondly, insofar as they misrepresent reality.

In the first case, he notes, the sense impression can

partake of falsity not as an entity itself, for every thing is truly what it
is, but only insofar as it presents things to the intellect.

In the second

case, the sense is false, strictly speaking, only when there is sense judgment, i.e., the action of the internal senses upon the common sensibles and
the sensibles

~

accidens; in the direct sensation of proper sensibles

falsity is only improperly said to occur, when there is an impediment in the
organ or the medium of cognition.
Article twelve concludes the treatise by raising the question of falsity
to the highest plane,

'~ether

falsity is in the intellect?"

The answer to

this is simply the natural correlate of article three, and the brevity of the
article indicates that he considers it such.

Falsity is properly said of the

intellect when judging, and never properly of its simple apprehension of quid
dities except insofar as there is an implied false judgment in a definition.
Such is the doctrine, very briefly, of St. Thomas's most formal treatise
on truth.

He treats of substantially the same points in questions 15 and 16

of the first part of the Summa Theologica.

It is there in much more con-

densed form--often, one must admit, without suffering in clarity on that account.

The long series of preliminary arguments give way to two or three at

r----------------~
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the head of each article.

The treatment smacks much less of the controversial

air of the disputation hall, and although St. Augustine is still prominent,
one is not so conscious of an effort to keep an audience of Augustinians
satisfied as the various points are taken up.

-

The subject-matter of portions

of De Veritate I is also treated in the commentary on the first Book of the

-

sentences, distinction 8, question l, article 3; distinction 19, question 5,
articles l, 2, and 3.

It is scattered through the Summa Contra Gentiles,

Book I, chapters 59, 60, 61, and 62; Book II, chapters 36, 83, and 84; Book
III, chapter 47.

?arts of it also appear in lecture 4 on Book VI of Aris-

totle's Metaphysics, Question
Theologioa, Ia, 85, 6.

XXI~

Veritate, articles land 3, and Summa

CHAPTER V
DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE
What the Good was to Plato, or Being to St. Thomas, Truth was to st.
Augustine.

"We gaze upon indestructible truth,nl he says, for "In every

place, 0 Truth, thou givest audience to such as consult thee, and at the same
time thou answerest all their demands, be they ever so diverse."2

Charles

Boyer, S.J., in the first sentence of the first chapter of his L'IdGe ~
v~rit~ ~.!!:,

Philosophie

~

Saint Augustin, states that "On every page of

st. Augustine, one reads the word truth." 3 Whether or not this be literally
true, the general Dnpression it conveys is sound.

s.J.,

When Fr. Erich Przywara,

undertook to arrange An Augustine Synthesis, he saw fit to set the key-

note, as it were, by devoting the first forty pages to Section I, "Truth," in
which he reproduces selections from all the important works of Aug~stine.4
Consequently, when St. Thomas essayed to discuss the subject of truth in
a series of formal disputations, he could not have helped being conscious of
the prevalence of Augustinians at the University of Paris in his day.

This

put him in a difficult predicament, for while he was determined to propound
the doctrine of Aristotle, he yet had to placate the Franciscans and other
1E! Trinitate, IX, vi, n. 9 (PL 42, 966).
2Confessiones, X, xxvi, n. 37 (PL 32, 795).
3Beauchesne, Paris, 1920, 1.
4Sheed & Ward, New York, 1936, 1-40.
23
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followers of Augustinian· teaching who made up such a large part of his audience if he wanted to gat a hearing at all.

Hence the notable prominence of

quotations from Augustine and of Augustinian expressions in the De Veritate
and the paucity of references to Aristotle, as compared with other and especially later works of St. Thomas.
In certain matters it was relatively easy to give Augustine prominence
as an authority, especially when there was question of the one
eternal truth, God.

f~rst

and

For in matters pertaining to God Aquinas really owes

much to Augustine, and finds no quarrel with the latter's exclamations, "O
Eternal Truth ••• thou art my God" 5

and "thou art truth presiding over all." 6

Also, the impact of the Neo-platonio strain in Augustine appears in such expressions as "exemplariter procedit" in De Veritate

~~

article 4, ad Sum.

But on other matters he saw in Augustinianism error which he could not
tolerate.

An early biographer of St. Thomas, William of Tocco, in speaking

of the disputed questions of St. Thomas seems extremely impressed with the
newness of doctrine contained therein:
He was proposing new articles in his lectures, finding
a new and clear method of determining, and adducing
ne~guments in the determinations; so that no one,
WhO had heard him teach these new things, could doubt
that God had illumined him with the rays of a new
light ••• so that he did not hesitate to teach and
write new opinions ••• 7
5Confessiones, VII, x, n. 16 (PL 32, 742).
6Ibid., X, xli, n. 66 (PL 32, 807) •
..........
7Vita Sancti Thamae, caput iii, n.l5, in Acta Sanctorum:
Ttranslation and italics mine).
·

Martii, I, 663

~
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this can best be interpreted as meaning that St. Thomas created no little
stir in a hall thronged with Augustinians by proposing theories which were
largely those of Aristotle.

Fo~

as M. Gilson has brought out in his excel-

lent study "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqu6 saint Augustin, n8

his quarrel

was really with Neoplatonism and with what the Platonizing Arabs had done to
Aristotle's doctrine.
ian philosophy,9

St. Thomas recognized the Platonic nature of Augustin-

though it is extremely difficult even for modern scholars

to say just how much influence the Neoplatonists had on Augustine.lO

Dr.

Martin Grabmann has studied the question with regard to the matter of cognition, so important De Veritate ~, in his Der Ggttliche Grund Menschlicher
Wahrheitserkenntnis

~

Augustinus

~

Thomas

~

Aquin, and tells us that

st. Augustine's theory is a grafting of Platonic and Neoplatonio influences
on the thought from the New Testament that Christ is the

"Li~ht

of the

world.nll
However that may be, the Platonizing Augustinians of the University of
8Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen ~ge, 1926, 1, 5-127.
9"Augustinus autem Platonem secutus quantum fides catholica patiebatur,"
Qq. Disp. De Spirit. Creat., q. un., a.lO ad Sum; but compare "Augustinus
""Se'quitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando," Summa Theol.,
Ia, 77, 5 ad 3um.
10cr. Charles Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Neo-Platonisme dans la Formation
de Saint Augustin, Beauchesne, Paris, 1~0, 233 pp., esp.CFiapiTre II, 11 Les

livres des Platoniciens, 11 79-119.
llAschendorff, Munster, 1924, 26. Cf. also Sancti Augustini Doctrina De Cognitione: Textus Select. (ed. Keeler, Pont. Oniv. ureg., Textus et Lrocumenta: Series Philosophica, 11), apud Aedes Greg. Dniv., Ramae, 1934, t
on Augustine's debt to the Platonists, 36-37; on the "lumen intelligibile, 11
53-63.
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paris and Platonizing Arabians like Alkindi, Alfarabi, Algazel, and Avicenna
were alike unwelcome to St. Thomas's Aristotelian mind.

On the fundamental

question of human cognition he held strongly for the Aristotelian acting intellect, abstracting essences from sense data and then reasoning to what is
above sense.

He opposed the ontologism and divine illumination theory com-

mon among the Franciscans which centered around truth in the judgment, as he
did the illumination and separate intellect theory of Avicenna concerning
the production of the concept.l2

Just what proportions of Platonism and

Aristotelianism go to make up the complete doctrine of St. Thomas is not easy
to determine;l3 unfortunately, he has left us no "Confessions" or "Discourse
on. Method."

But Wilhelm Schneider is not far wrong in his "Die Q.uestiones

Disputatae des Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Philosophiegeschichtlicher Beziehung
zu Augustinustt when he says that in the matter of human cognition Aquinas
paid lip service to Augustine in the discussions, but held close to
line of thought in his own doctrine.l 4

Aristotle~

However, Aquinas does take what is

true in Augustine and incorporate it into his own doctrine whenever possible,
and tries at every point to show that he is not in opposition to Augustine
when properly understood.
12Etienne Gilson, "Les sources GrGco-Arabes de 1' augustinisnte avicennisant,"
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen lge, 1929, IV, 5-107.
13Aime Forest, La~Structure M~taphysique du Concret selon Saint Thomas
J. Vrin, PariB; 1931, 323-325.
--

d'A~

14Beitrgge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Ndttelalters,
1930, XXVII, 93. Cf. also-Ch. Boyer, s.J:; Essais sur la Doctrine de
Saint Augustin, Beauchesne, Paris, 1932, Chapitre v:-vsaint Thomas et saint
Augustin, 11 138-165.

~--~--~---------------------------------.
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Another thing to remark about the De Veritate from the standpoint of
doctrine is that it is one of the chief sources for texts relative to the
critical problem and the so-called Louvain solution.

St. Thomas never dis-

cusses the matter formally. but moderns interested in the problem find much
to say about the last four articles and especially articles nine and eleven.
To give even a brief survey of the literature of this question is far beyond
the compass of this work, as is evident from a mere listing of such names as

No8l,

Roland-Goss~lin,

Cardinal Mercier, Jeanniere, Picard. Jolivet, Mar~chal

Bonnet, de Tonquadeo, Barron. Boyer, 1maritain, Gilson. Rousselot, Gardeil.
Naber. Kremer, Sentroul, Leslie Walker. Frank Simon, and Chevalier.

(It is

peculiar to note that in Mar~chal's ~Point de Depart~ la M6taphysique.
replete though it is with quotations from st. Thomas,l5 no mention of De
Veritate

~

meets the eye, and there are only a few citations from the other

question of De Veritate.)

Paul Wilpert is quite right in "Das Problem dar

Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von Aquin:

Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des

Evidenzproblems" when he says that St. Thomas was undoubtedly a realist, and
avoided the difficulties arising from Augustinianism by adhering to Aristotelian realism.l6

An important point, however, is that he escapes the semi-

sensism of Aristotle by his clever working out of the matter of intellectual
15J. Nar~chal, S.J •• Le Point de Depart de la ~taphysique, Museum Lessianum,
Louvain, 1927, I, ~93; 192tf; V, 33-4Er.f.--

16Beitr~ge zur Geschichte d~r Philosophie und Theologie des Y~ttelalters.

1931, XXX~07. He gives:ii good bibliography of the critical problem, as
does Edward F. Talbot, Knowledge and Object, Paulist Press, New York, 1932,
107-111.
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reflection in articles nine and twelve. 17 M. Gilson's R~alisme Thomiste is
perhaps the best expression of how the doctrine of St. Thomas stands with
regard to the critical problein. 18

St. Thomas's treatise on falsity in ar-

ticles ten, eleven, and twelve is also most illuminating in this connectionl9
A final feature to be noted about the doctrine of De Veritate I is the
prominence given to sense knowledge in the treatise.

This is brought out by

a study of the texts and usages which appear under the words

APPREHE~~O,

COGNITIO, COGNOSCO, JUDICIUM, JUDICO, VERITAS, VERUiv1, VERE, etc., in the body
of the diotionary.20

In brief, St. Thomas uses all these terms with refer-

ence to sense knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge.

The significance

of this for the critical problem is brought out by Gilson in his R~alisme
Thomiste.21

St. Thomas's treatment avoids Platonism both in epistemology and

17see also Blaise Romeyer, "La Doctrine de Saint Thomas sur la v~rit6," .Archives de Phi1osophie, 1925, III, n. 2, 32. On the importance of inte~
lectual:reflection as described by St. Thomas in De Veritate I, see also
Blaise Romeyer, "Saint Thomas et notre connais sance de 1 I esprit humain,"
Archives de Philosophie, 1928, VI, n. 2, 1-114. That Augustine is the
source of~is is clear from an examination of De Trin., IX, iv (PL 42,
963), and vi (PL 42, 965-966).
-l8Etienne Gilson, R~alisme Thomiste et Critique~~ Connaissance, J. Vrin,
Paris, 1939, 239 PP•
19
.
See also Leo W. Keeler, S.J., The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant, apud
Aedes Greg. Uni v., Romae, 1934-;-chapter V,"'St. Thoma:s;11 83-llL.20see also Joseph de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Beauchesne,
Paris, 1929, Chapitre VI, "La question de 'la~rit~, 11 219-246, and Appendice VIII, "Commentaire des trois premiers articles de la question I de
Veritate," 508-518; Ch. Boyer, "Le sens d'un texte de saint Thomas 'de
Veritate q. 1, a. 9 111 , Gregorianum, 1924, V, 424-443, and the remarks of
Wilpert on this latter, ~ ~~ 114-119.
21 ep. cit., 184-239.

--
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regard to the ultimate nature of man, guarantees the realiam of our in-

tellectual knowledge, and brings out strongly the unity of our cognitive
processes.

II.

THE DICTIONARY

NOTE ON THE METHOD OF

ARRANGEME~~

Treatment of the Vocabulary Items.
The aim of this work is primarily to establish the meaning of the
various words which make up the philosophical vocabulary of Saint
Aquinas in the first of his disputed questions on truth.
pointed as far as possible to this end.

Thorr~s

Everything has been

Many helps for translation are

give~

but the English equivalents are offered first of all as an attempt to indicate meaning, whatever the result in point of beauty or smoothness of expression so achieved.
Likewise, the aim being philosophical and not literary, only those words
are studied which have some philosophical import or are peculiar to the
language of St. Thomas, or which are necessary to the understanding of his
meaning.

And since it is his meaning with which we are here concerned, no

attempt has been made to study the vocabulary of other writers quoted by him,
except insofar as he makes their language his own in later discussion.

For

the same reason the language of the preliminary dialectical arguments with
which each article begins, sometimes questionably called "objections," is
quite obviously of no concern here unless taken up by Aquinas in his reply;
experience in constructing the dictionary has shown that the study of words
in these arguments is otherwise irrelevant, for they are sometimes deliberately beguiling and vague and downright equivocal, and never represent the
30
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tor.med opinion of Saint Thomas.!
Unless the contrary is explicitly stated, the principal source of evidance on which the choice of meaning is based is the context.

This means the

way Saint Thomas uses the word in the passage cited, as compared with other
occurrences of the word in Question I of De Veritate, but nowhere else, whatever other works of St. Thomas or extraneous sources may have been,consulted.
This exclusive use of textual evidence guarantees the usefulness of the dietionary for comparative studies.
It is presupposed throughout this work that the reader has some knowledge of Latin.

It does not presume to supplant a standard Latin dictionary

when use of such may be necessary for words not appearing in this dictionary,
or for details of grammatical forms, etc.

The source for all classical

usages has been the Lewis and Short revision of Harper's Latin Dictionary.2
Mechanics of the Dictionary.
The system of arrangement used was designed with a view to making up for
lack of that variety of type-faces at the disposal of the printer, and at the
same time of not employing such a multitude of arbitrary signs and artificial
devices as to render the dictionary difficult to use.

1see the~ under the word OBJICIO in the body of the dictionary, infra.
2Founded on the translation of Freund's Latin-German Lexicon edited by E. A.
Andrews (rev. Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short), American Book Company,
New York, 1907, xiv-2019 PP•
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The vocabulary entries are made up as follows,
First, the word studied is given in its alphabetical place, in capital
letters.

If a verb, it is listed under the first person singular, present

indicative active, followed simply by the infinitive ending.

When a parti-

ciple is used as an adjective or substantive in its own right, and the verb
from which it is derived does not appear in the work, it is listed under its
own form.

Likewise the verbal substantives "esse," "essendi," and "ens."

For nouns, the genitive singular is given, and the three genders of the
nominative singular are given in the case of adjectives.

The part of speech

is not further indicated except when there is danger of confusion or for
some other special reason.
phrase.

Phrases are listed under the first word of the

Cross references are given.

On the same line with the word-entry, a simple English translation of
the word is attempted, giving the basic meaning common to all further refinements.

If possible, this is done by giving one word which will serve as an

English equivalent in translation of the word anywhere in the work, though
perhaps without all the shades of connotation discussed later.

However, if

such an equivalent is not available, as many words are added in this basic
translation as are necessary to sum up the representative meaning of the word
in the various contexts.

This basic and general meaning is always followed

by a period.
Each subsequent refinement of meaning or added translation is given on
a. new line, and is always followed by a colon(:).

It may be followed by ex-

planations and examples of usage quoted from the text.

These citations and
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explanations are followed by a period only when there is a distinct change of
meaning, otherwise the subdivisions and clarifications are separated by a
semicolon (;).

Meanings of a word which are notably divergent are indicated

by arabic numerals (1, 2), slight variations in meaning or differences of
usage by small letters (a, b).
Bvery specific meaning set down is justified by the citation of at least
one context from De Veritate I in which the word occurs with that meaning,
!

the word studied being underlined.

~ach

occunence is identified after the

manner of the Bekker paging of the works of Aristotle, by page, column (a or
b), and line, not separated by any punctuation.

Thus, 2al7 means thatthis

word appears on page 2, the left-hand column, line seventeen, in the context
.
cited. 1'he location of every other occurrence of the word in that meaning
is added, preceded only by a comma.
explained above (p. 15).

The edition used is the Marietti, as

The location of the word under consideration is

always given without parentheses; that of any other word referred to is in
parentheses.

In the case of a few words used very frequently and with con-

sistent meaning throughout the work, only a few typical citations are given
and any discrepancies noted, as will be stated in each case.
If reference is made to the alphabetical listing of another word in this
dictionary, the word is printed in capital letters.

If cross-reference is

made, the reader is simply told to "see" the other heading.

If for the unde

standing of the meaning of one word comparison is necessary with the discussion of another word, the reader is told to "confer"

(~,

or q.v.) the other
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entrY•

If it is felt that another word will throw some additional light on

a topic, reference is indicated by "see also."

A

ABSOLUTE
1.

adv.

Absolutely, unqualifiedly.

Absolutely:

opposed to relatively --

to "in se", which is contrasted with

10, equivalent

3al~
11

in ordine ad

aliud" (2b54).
2.

In every respect:
a)

unqualifiedly:

2b7, equivalent to

b)

with no exceptions:

11

per se 11 {23b4);

"oportet etiam absolute dicere,

quod omnia veritas sit a Deo" 20b27.
ABSTRAHO, -ERE

To abstract.

To prescind:

"tDei) cognitio ••• abstrahit ab omni tempore"

13a34.
Note.

The word literally means to draw away from, but in

philosophical usage it usually means to abstract, to attend to
some aspect and disregard same other.

The most usual sense is

that of intellectual abstraction of intelligible form from a
material body.

In this, the only occurrence of the word in

this work, the meaning is not so restricted, but closely similar.

ACCEPTIO, -IONIS

-

Acceptance, acceptation.

The understanding of a word or statement in a certain sense:
18b52;

of. ACCIPIO, l.
35
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ACCIDENS, -ENTIS

n.

Accident.

That which is non-essential:
1.

hence,

In the real or physical order,
opposed to "res" -- "quantum ad accidentia, mutatio accidere
potest etiam manente re" 18a7;
opposed to "quod quid est" --

11

accidentia magnam pa:riem con-

ferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est" 23a36;
opposed to "natura"

"color auri et alia hujusmodi

accidentia" 23a47;
opposed to "essentia" -- "sensus et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt" 26a54.
2.

In the mental order,
a non-essential note:

11

per modum quo differentia additur

generi, vel accidens subjecto" 2b29.
3.

The logical fallacy resulting from an illegitimate shift
from accidental to essential or necessary predieation:
11

fallacia accidentis" 20b32.

(PER) ACCIDENS
ACCIDE1~ALIS,

see
-E

adj.

PER ACCIDENS.
Incidental.

That which need not be, an attribute which does not necessarily
pertain to a given subject:

"Veritas autem quae dicitur de

rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quodammodo accidentalis, quia posito quod intellectus humanus non

r.--------:-----------.
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asset nee esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia permanerent"
9a22;
opposed to "essentialis"

in a context of the same import

as above, 23b6.
Used as a substantive, equivalent to ACCIDENS, 1 -- "mutatio
accidere potest etiam manente re, et ita quantum ad accidentalia
potest fieri mutatio veritatis rei" 18a9.
ACCIPIO, -ERE
1.

To accept.

Except as noted belov1, nn. 2, 3, the word is always used in
this work in a metaphorical sense,
to take mentally, to consider in such a way, to take as
meaning a certain thing:

"nomen intellectus dupliciter

accipi potest" 26b4, "si intellectus accipiatur secundum
illam actionem a qua nomen intellectus imponitur" 26b37, etc.
2.

Once it is taken in a logical sense,
to include:

"qui rationem non entis accipit in seipso"

3bl5.
3.

A few times it is taken in a literal or ontological sense,
to be acted upon, to receive a perfection from outside:

"in

majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus"
26al2, "intellectus speculativus accipit a rebus" 5b29,
"intellectus a rebus scientiam accepit" 9a36, "intelleotus
aliquid acoipit a sensu" 26al5.

r------------------------~
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Action, activity, operation.

ACTIO, -IONIS
1.

Very broadly, in any sense in which a being can be said to
"agere 11 (q.v.) -- 24al4, 23.

2.

The proper action of a specific human power:

11

illam actionam

a qua nomen intellectus imponitur 11 26b38; of'. ACTUS, 2.
ACTIVUS, -A, -UM
Being

a

Active

source of action as opposed to a recipient, active:

"principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus 11 2lb27.
Note.

This is an excellent instance of the way St. Thomas

reminds us of the fact that, although the acting intellect and
the possible intellect are really distinct (of. Summa Theologica,
Ia, 79, 7 corp.), still they must not be separated to the extent
of failing to consider the intellect as a whole, as one active
principle, including the possible intellect which is the formally
cognitive part.
ACTUS, -US

Act, actuality, action, perfection.

In general, the word signifies actuality as opposed to the
various senses of potency.
1.

The act of existence, the actuality of existence:

3a6-7,

3b30, 4b9, 10 -- it is so interpreted explicitly by st.
Thomas when he makes "actus essendi 11 (4b7) equivalent to
"essen (4b6) --"cum dicitur

1

Diversum est esse et quod est,•
'

distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit"

r----------------------------------~
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4b5-8, where the "actus ille" clearly refers to "actus
essendi"; thus the ablative,
actually, really, in existence:
actually existing:
2.

6a48, 14a23 (twice);

"in actu" 12b32.

Second act as distinguished from first act (existence),
a)

synonymous with ACTIO, 2,
act, activity, action, operation, perfection:
11

actibus animae" 5b9, "virtutis ••• actum" 14a55,

"actus intellectus" 6b32, 33, 2lbl4, 20, 22, 25, of
sense power 2lb32, 40;
the activity proper to a given thing:

"naturalis

actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo, nisi per
accidens impediatur" 25b43; including
the action of God, considered entitatively and not
terminatively, and hence in this case not really
distinct from Himself:
2la6, 7, 12, "in
b)

~

"actus divinae voluntatis'•
int ellectus di vini 11 6a54;

looked at as an entity in itself rather than as the
operation or perfection of the acting principle,
the act, the deed:
the act:

"actus fornicationis" 20b35, 53, 56,

ttactus cognitionis est medius inter cognos-

centem et cognitum 11 2lb50.
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ADAEQUATIO, -IONIS

Equation, equivalence, correspondence,
similarity.

Note.

St. Thomas seems to have recognized that the word literal-

ly means "equality to", as is evident from its use in 23al as
the opposite of

11

ina.equalitas" (23a3).

This is further brought

out by his example from algebra of "equals subtracted from
equals" (17a54-55) in a context where he uses it in the typical
sense found in this work, namely as expressing that relation
between intellect and thing known in which is fulfilled the
formal notion of truth, 17a53.
Still it is obvious from a comparative study of contexts
that when so used it never quite means mathematical equality,
but rather a correspondence between the real and the repre.sentative orders, a "sort of equation" -pbll.

11

adaequationem quamdam"

That mathematical equality is not meant is further brought

out by the fact that he uses it to express the relation of the
Divine intellect to finite things, and to negative entities
(cf. infra).

This equality or correspondence refers to that

which is represented, though the manner of existence in the two
differs.
Explicitly equivalent to
tas 11 in 3a47, to

11

11

correspondentia 11 in 3a43, to

11

conformi-

commensuratio" in 12b29, and "proportio 11

(2lb23) and "aequalitas" (18b7, 12, 19) and used to the same
effect.
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The word most frequently used in the definition of truth -- "quae
quidam correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur,
et in hoc formalis ratio veri perficitur" 3a44, and likewise in
3b27, 5a40, 41, 6b35, 42, l2bll.
Used to express both the relation of intellect to thing l0a54,
20a25 and thing to intellect 20bl3, 38, and of both Divine 5b47,
10a54, 23al8 and human intellect 5b55, and also of both "intellectus mensurans" and "intellectus mensuratus" 5b45, and even of
the conformity of the intellect when one of the terms of the
relation is non-existent 12b29 or a negation 20b38, 23al8.
In 10a51 it might better be translated "mode, or manner," of
equation or correspondence.
To equal, to correspond.

ADAEQUO, -ARE
a)

active.

To make (the human mind) conform or correspond to,

to adequate:

"omne ens potest sibi adaequare intellectum

humanum" 6a22;
to bring (our mind or intellect) into conformity with:

9b5,

13b5.
b)

passive.

Most frequently used, always to express that

relation of mind and object described as truth,
to be made equal to, to be equated to, to correspond to, to
measure up to:

it is used in all the different ways in

which ADAEQUATIO (q.v.) is used -- of intellect to things
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18b28, 20a25 and things to intellect 20a43, 20bl6, of
Divine 7a27, l0a51, 53, 56, 12b39, 13b3, 14a22 and human
intellect 7a28, 20a43, of relation to non-existent objects,
whether future 12b33, 39, 14a22, 28 or negative 20a49, 20b8,
23al3, but the meaning always remains the same -- "ens non
potest intelligi sine hoc quod correspondeat vel adaequetur
intellectui" 3b51, 6b36, 51, 7a41, 17b47, 18bl6.
c)

~participle.

formed:

proportionate, commensurate, adequated, con-

"adaequata" 5b21, 6al7, 21, 9b4.

ADDITIO, -IONIS

Addition.

Used in this work only in the sense of the adding of notes to
the comprehension of an idea or concept -- "omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens" 2b26.
ADDO, -ERE

To add.

Used in the same sense as ADDITIO {q.v.) only -- "modum quo
differentia additur generi" 2b28; so also 2b26, 33, 43, 45.
See also

Su~ERADDO.

AEQUALITAS, -ATIS

Equality, correspondence, similarity,
equivalence.

1.

Used, less frequently than ADAEQUATIO but in the same way,
to express the relation between mind and object in the
definition of truth.

The drawing of an analogy between its

r·

43
literal, strict sense of mathematical equality and its use
in his definition and discussion of truth indicates that it
is not to be taken literally in such context -- "inaequalitatem ••• quae se habet ad falsitatem siout aequalitas ad
veritatem" 7b9; much less does it mean identity -- "sed
aequalitas diversorum est" 6b37.

This is further confir.med

by its use to express the relation between the Divine intellect and finite things 18b7, 12, 19.
2.

Literally, when speaking of the Trinity,
equality:

"aequalitas in divinis quandoque importat rationem

quae designat distinctionem personalem, sicut cum dicimus
quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales; et secundum hoc, in
nomine aequalitatis, realis distinctio intelligitur.

Quando-

que autem in nomine aequalitatis non intelligitur realis
distinotio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dioimus sapientiam
et bonitatem divinam esse aequales ••• et talis est distinctio
importata per nomen veritatis, cum sit aequalitas intellectus
et essentiae'' 19a2-15.
AEQUO, -ARE

To equal, to correspond to, to be in conformi ty with.

Used, less frequently than ADAEQUARE but in the same way, to
express relation of mind and object -- 4a25;

l

used of both human and divine intellect -- 13bl0; 13bl3 --
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"intellectui cuicumque aequetur."
It is used in the passive voice throughout.
Estimate, conception.

AESTIMATIO, -IO!JIS
Concept:

11

vera.m aestimationem (rei in intellectu humano]" 5b57;

correct estimate, judgment:

7a31;

evaluating action of the mind:

"aestima tionem animae

Cde

rebus1"

6a39.

AFFECTIO, -IONIS

Impression.

Imposed state, impression, condition received:

"sensus non

possunt omnino enuntiare nisi affectionem suam" 25bl -- equivalent
to

11

dispositio 11 25a54 (q.v.).

Note that the word does not mean a feeling state as in modern
psychology.
AFFIR!~IO,

Affirmation.

-IONIS

Positive predication, affirmation:

"definitio non potest esse

falsa, nisi in quantum implicat affirmationem falsam" 26b33;
3b33, 24a9;
assertion:

"affirmationem propositionis" 23b17.

AGO, -ERE
1.

To act.
To act, to operate:
agere" 22al4;

"potentiae naturales insensibiles •••

45
opposed to being acted upon -- "anima non patitur ••• sed
magis quodammodo agit" 23a54,
to act (upon):

11

agentis et patientis 11 18al9;

"quamvis malum non agat in animam nisi per

speciam boni" 2la42, 24a16.
2.

With "de",
to treat, to discuss:

(INTELLECTUS) AGENS
ALIQUID, -CUJUS
1.

a)

"de qua agebat" l3a44.

INTELLECTUS AGENS.

see
neut. pron.

Something.

Technically defined as distinct being,
some other:

"ens accipiatur secundum divisionem

unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen 'aliquid',
dicitur enim aliquid quasi

1

aliud quid'; unde sicut

ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita
dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum11
3al3-22.

This

et~~ology

is confirmed in classical

Latin.
b)

Except in this explanatory text in the first article,
untechnically,
something, something or other:

2.

except,

"something" in the logical order, some note:

"verum et ens

differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri
quod non est in ratione antis'' 4a29; so in 2b27, 33, 4a31,
52, 57, 14b22, 23b31.

r
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f

Alteration.

ALTERATIO, -IONIS

Change of intrinsic, accidental form:

16b57.

Soul.
1.

The subject in 'Which our operative powers reside:

11

in anima

autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva 11 3a28; hence,
the (ultimate) principle of our operations:

11

actibus

animae 11 5b9; especially
the subject of intellectual operations:

11

anina, quae quodam-

modo est omnia" 3a26.
2.

By synecdoche, the whole being taken for the part, i.e., the
ultimate subject for the proximate principles of operation,
the mind:
a)

the knower:
i)

as opposed to the thing known, whether

extra-mental reality -- "res extra animam"
5bl0, 6a26, 38, 40, 6b41, 45, 9a50, 13a53,
20a35, 45, 50; or

ii)

privations and negations --

11

non anti, quod

est extra animam 11 2la29, 31, 32;
b)

mind, the (proximate) subject of knowledge:

i)

sometimes non-committal as to whether sense
knowledge or intellectual knowledge is involved
-- 5b3, 13b7, 8, 17, 20b57, the subject of the
total act of knowing, used equivalently to
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"mens nostra" (10b3):

"res ••• noti tiam sui in

anima gignit" 24bl7, 23a31, "malum non agat in
animam. nisi per speciem boni" 2la42, "falsitas in
anima" 23a49, "veritas in anima" 9b34, l0b6,
"anima decipi" 24a33, 37;
ii)

intellect:

"anima deprehendit in se rationem

defectus" 2la44;
intellect as judging:
9b44, 23a52,

11

11

anima de omnibus judicat"

anima ••• an:imae quae cointelligit

tempus componendo et dividendo" l3al4, 16, "compositio quam facit anima" 20b52;
intellect taken as a whole, acting and possible:
"sed anima ipsa hoc facit conformans seipsam
nonenti" 2la29.
.f'.uli[IM!L, -IS

Animal •

Used only in examples of false judgment or false definition made by
combining predicates that are irreconcilable -- "animal insensibile 11
7al5, 17, "animal rationale mortale" 26b24, 29, 30.
Note.

From these instances it is easily inferred that the essential

characteristic of animality is sensory life, and that animal is a
generic notion including both brute animal and rational animal or
man.
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APPAREO,

-1RE

To appear, to be externally observable.

Used only of the sensible qualities of an object -- "res enim
notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent,
quia cognitio nostra initium a sensu summit" 23a32, 23bl.
APPETITIVUS, -A, •UM

Orectic, appetitive, affective.

Adj. from APPETITUS, q.v.

Very general, opposed to "cognitivatt

-- "vis cognitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "motus appetitivae virtutis terminatur ad res" 5b6.

-us

APPETITUS,
a)

Appetite, affection.

A generic word to express the activity or affection of a
thing toward the good, or the power of being so affected or
so acting:

"convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit

hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principia

~~h.

dicitur, 'bonum est

quod omnia appetunt'" 3a30, "bonum ••• dioit ordinem ad
appetitum" 5bl6;
b)

specifically,
intellectual appetite, the will:

"res intellecta movet

appetitum, et appetitus tunc duoit ad hoc quod perveniat ad
rem a qua motus incepit" 5bl2.
Note.

It seems that no one word is adequate to express the idea

conveyed by this term as used by St. Thomas.

This is no doubt

because it is not univocal but analogous, and must be applicable
to the various acts of a variety of things from the natural
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inclination of an insensible body for acting in a certain way to
the will of God which is identified with the Divine Essence
Itself.

The word is derived literally from "ad" and

11

peto", and

involves a strong connotation of striving or desiring or tending
toward:

but the motion and imperfection so implied are not only

inapplicable to the Divine Will but also to those acts of the
human will which regard a good toward which there is no longer
tendency or motion but which is actually possessed and enjoyed,
including certain acts of love, "delectatio", "fruitio", "consensus", "usus", etc.

(Cf. Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 12, arts.

1-16).
Spearman suggests Aristotle's word "orexis" (C. Spearman,
Psychology~

the Ages, Macmillan Company, London, 1937, I,

303), and this is Brennan's choice also (Robert Brennan, O.P.,
Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan Company, New York, 1941, 148,
210).

But this word in Greek, although it has a very broad

meaning, conveys the same notion of tending (hence motion, imperfection) as the Latin "appetitus", so the solution thus offered
is unsatisfactory.
the verb

11

St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, 19, uses

affici 11 in this connection, and the root meaning of the

English word "affection", "to be affected toward", implied in
such a usage indicates that some such word as affection or even
attitude might be the most nearly approximate equivalent for the
full breadth of "appetitus".

r
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To desire, to tend toward, to be affected

APPETO, -ERE

toward.
The root verb from which APPETITUS (q.v.) is derived.

It does

not seem to have lost so much of its original root meaning as
the noun, but retains a meaning closer to that indicated by the
literal derivation -- "bonum est quod omnia appetun"t;" 3a33.
APPREffi."'NDO, •ERE

To apprehend.

Literally, to take hold of, to grasp, to seize, but used in this
work exclusively in a metaphorical sense to express the act of
the knower in somehow possessing or uniting itself to the thing
known.
a)

of intellectual kJaowledge,
to conceive, to understand:

11

apprehensum ab intellectu 11

4a38;
to have within the scope of:

"apprehensum sub intel-

leotu" 4a46;
to know (in terms of simple essence):

"dioimur propria

intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditatem rerum" 26b7,
"negationes et pri vationes ••• intelleotus ••• earum rationes
apprehendit 11 20a51,

11

apprehensa" 6b48, 54;
b)

of sense knmvledge,
to sense, to know:

intelleotus ••• inoipit judicare de re
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i)

in contrast to "sense judgment" -- "in sensu •••
secundum hoc quod sensibile apprehendit, non est
veritas et falsitas propria, sed solum secundum
ordinem ad judicium quod ex formatione praedicta
consequitur" 25b28;

ii)

not opposed to, but rather including in a very
general way the notion of sense-judgment
a')

of proper (external) sense power
"quaedam vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilam sensibili re
praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b56,
"et ideo sensus apprehendit rem ut est"
26a3;

b')

of imagination-- "quaedam vis apprehendit
eam re absente, sicut imaginatio" 26al,
"sed ima.ginatio apprehandit ut plurinrum
rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut
praesentem, cum sit absens 11 26a6, 7.

APPREHENSIO, -IONIS

Apprehension.

Literally, a grasping, a taking hold of, but used always here
of the knowing process metaphorically, in a sense like that of

APPREHENDO ( q. v. )
a)

of the intellect,

r
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i)

of simple apprehension of an object, in contrast
to judgment,
apprehension, conception, understanding:

"anima

vero in quantum de rebus judicat, quodammodo agit.
Unde res non dicitur falsa quia semper de se
falsam facit apprehensionem" 23a56, "actus (.rornicationis] apprehensioni animae adaequatur" 20b57;
ii)

in a broader sense, implying judgment also,
estimate:

"[res] natae sunt facere de se veram

apprehensionem in intellectu humane" 20a32, 38;
b)

of sense,
i)

in contrast to sense-judgment (cf. APPREHENDO,
b, i), sensation:

11

ex apprehensione tali natum

est sequi tale judicium" 25b33;
ii)

more generally, to include the total act of senseknowledge (cf. APPREHENDO, b-, ii), perception:
"apprehensionem sensus" 25b54.

APPREHENSIVUS, -A, -UM
Adj.

from

APPREHE~~O,

apprehensiva 11 25b56.
APPROPRIO, -ARE

Cognitive, knowing.
q.v.

Used of sense-power -- "vis

See also ELECTIVUS, Note.
To appropriate, to assign or ascribe to.

A theological rather than philosophical term, meaning to
predicate an (essential, not personal) attribute of, or ascribe
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a work to, a certain Person of the Blessed Trinity -- "si veritas
propria accipiatur, essentialiter dicitur, taman appropriatur
Personae I<'ilii 11 18b40, "quamvis tres illae personae di vinae re
distinguuntur, taman personae (The Vives edition notes that one
11

of the Paris codices (B) reads

personis 11 here, a better read-

ing.] appropriata non differunt re, sed rati,one" 4bl9, 24.
Art, exemplar, design.

ARS, -TIS

Knowledge of a thing to be produced:
exemplar, exemplary idea, model, idea:
~

"omnia (positiva] ab

divini intellectus proveniunt" 23al0, "(res] imitantur in-

tellectum divinum, qui est earum mansura, sicut
omnium artificiatorum11 20a29,

11

~

est mansura

res ••• divino intellectui adaequa-

tur, sicut artificialis arti" 13b4; design, plan:

"ordinationem

rerum in intellectu divino existentam, sicut ••• secundum ordinationam artis in artifice" 15b6.
Note.

The meaning of this word always includes what in modern

times is called "practical" as well as "fine" art; in fact, the
fgrmer notion is more predominant in St. Thomas's usage, contrary to the modern notion of art.

Moreover, the word always

refers in this work to something in the intellect -- "ars et
cetera quae ad intellectum pertinent" 18b41 -- not mere skill in
external execution.

This is brought out clearly by a comparison

of the two passages in which. St. Thomas curiously interchanges
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11

ars" with "exemplar" and

11

intellectusn -- "res ••• per formam

suam imitantur artem divini intellectus" 20a36, 24bl5, and
"formam, per quam vel imitentur exemplar divinae artis" 20a47.
ARTIFEX, -ICIS

Artisan.

Following the notion of ARS (of. Note, s.v.), the word refers
not to an artist in the modern sense but rather means artisan,
worker, craftsman, designer:

"artificiata in intellectu

artificis" 5b38, "ordinatio artis in artifice" 15b7.
ARTIFICIALIS, -E

adj. and subst.

Artificial, manufactured,
produced by man.

Refers to anything produced by the skill of man, as opposed to
natural generation or formation -- "res artificiales" 5b43,
"res ••• divino intellectui adaequatur, sicut artificialis arti"
13b3.
ARTIFICIATUM, -I

neut. subst.

(not classical)

Manufactured article, human product:

Artefact.

"artificiata" 5b37,

"artificiatorum" 20a30.
ASSIMILATIO, -IONIS

Assimilation.

The reception of an impression by which the knower becomes like
or acquires a certain similarity to the thing known, hence, a
"becoming liken:

"omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimila-

tionem cognoscentis ad rem cognftam, ita quod assimilatio dicta
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est causa cognitionis" 3a36, 37.
Note.

That this assimilation (which may be interpreted as the

reception of the impressed species) does not formally constitute
cognition is clear from the fact that St. Thomas here makes them
cause and effect, which are always really distinct.
Veritate ~' 6, ~Potentia
Critique~~

1!,

5.

Compare

E!

And see Joseph de Tonquedec

Connaissance (Beauchesne, Paris, 1929), Appendice

II, "Connaissance et Assimilation", 461-467.
To notice, to recognize.

ATTENDO I -ERE

Used only in a non-committal way almost synonymous with "cognos co''

"adaequatio inter intellectum et rem attendi potest"

6b42.
AUCTORITAS, -ATIS

Authoritative quotatiop, argument from
authority.

Used only once in this work, to refer to words of St. Augustine
quoted in the dialectical arguments preceding the body of the
article -- "in auctoritate inducta" 25a56.
AURlJM FALSUM

Fool's gold.

That which can be mistaken for gold because of external appearances, probably iron or copper pyrites:

"aurum falsum, in quo

exterius apparet color auri, et alia hujusmodi acoidentia, cum
tamen interius natura auri non subsit" 23a45.
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B

Goodness.

BONITAS, -ATIS
11

The abstract of

bonum", the attribute of being good:

••• ipsa ratio bonitatis 11 24bl8;

11

11

in rebus

dicimus sapientiam et bonitatem

divinam esse aequales" l9all.
Good.

BONUS, -A, -UM
a)

As an adjective,
The attribute of a thing by which it is appetible, or which
establishes a relation of suitability of that thing with
appetite:

11

convenientiam ergo entia ad appetitum exprimit

hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principia Ethic. dicitur:

'bonum

est quod omnia appetunt'" 3a3l, 32, "bonum dicit ordinem ad
appetitum 11 5bl4;
an attribute or property not really distinct from the one,
the true, and being, even in creatures -- "ens, verum, unum,
et bonum ••• non oportet quod in rebus creatis distinguantur
etiam realiter" 4b26, "sed ens, verum, unum et bonum secundum
suam rationem habent quod sit unum" 4b36;
but which does express a character not formally expressed by
the term being, hence a "quasi-differentia" of "ens" -"verum propria loquendo non potest esse differentia entia •••
sed aliquod verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae,
sicut et bonum; in quantum, videlicet, exprimit aliquid

57
circa ens quod nomine antis non exprimitur" 23b30; "bonum
est quod Deus permittat deformitatem incidere" 2lal4;
b)

used in a more substantive way,
i)

in a quasi-abstract sense,
good, the good, goodness:

"bonum et malum sunt in

rebus" 5bl8, "bonum, debitum, rectum, et hujusmodi
omnia alio modo se habent ad permissionem divinam, et
alio modo ad alia signa divinae voluntatis" 2lal,
"hoc pertinet ad rationem boni" 20b55, "unde in hoc
consistit ejus bonum" 20b24, "bonum uniuscujusque rei
consistit in perfecta operatione ejus" 20bl9;
ii)

more concretely,
a good, some good, good thing:
animam nisi per

speciem~;

"malum non agat in
quia taman est bonum

deficiens, anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus"
2la43, "omne bonum sit a Deo" 20b25, "ipse honor
parentum bonum quoddam est" 2lal0, "ipsum verum sicut
bonum intellectus" 20bl7, 24b24.

58

c
CADO, -ERE

To fall.

Used figuratively,
To fall under the scope of, to be the object of:

"id quod cadit

sub actu voluntatis" 2la6, "id quod sub permissions cadit" 2lal4.
CAUSA, -AE
a)

Cause.
11

Non-committal -- "ut causa aliorum" 5a48,

ad creaturas ••• in-

tellectus divinus comparatur ut mansura et causa" 18b34,
9a34 (the question of how God's intellect is the cause of
creatures is not discussed);
b)

efficient cause:

"unde non esse extra animam existens non

est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris 11 2la32,
in reference to which passage is to be read -- "non esse non
est causa veritatis negativarum propositionum quasi faciens
eas in intellectu" 2la27, so also 23a49;

11

illa quae sunt

causa aliorum essendi 11 4al4, "causa veritatis aliorum" 4al6;
and by inference, "assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis"
3a38 (cf. ASSIMILATIO, ~ s.v.)
Note.

In "causa exemplari efficiente" 2la34, the

omits the

11

exemplari 11

Viv~s

edition

on the authority of three of the four

Paris codices used (cf. EFFICIENS, Note).
The word is used in this work without any attempt to define it
or take care as to its technical meaning.
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To cause.

CAUSO, -ARE

Like "CAUSA", the word is used here in a general and usually
unspecified sense -- "inaequalitas ex ipsa re causatur" 23a30,
"intellectus practicus causat res" 5b27; but with a slight implication of efficient causality-- "nee taman res (falsa} •••
necessaria falsitatam causet" 23a50, "negationes at dafectus •••
Deus-non oauset 11 23al5.
CLAUDO, -ERE
Note.

To enclose, to bound.
The word is quoted from St. Anselm in the first dialeoti

argument of the article (5), and is thus distinguished in the
reply by St. Thomas --

11

veritas enuntiationis non clauditur

principia et fine, non quod absque principia ratio fuerit, sed
quia non potest intelligi quando illa oratio esset et veritas
i l l i deesset" 13a41.

COGIT.ATIVA (VIS)
COGNITIO, -IONIS

see

VIS COGITATIVA.
Knowledge.

The result of assimilation -- "cognitio perficitur per assimilationem oognoscentis ad cognitum, ita quod assimilatio dicta est
causa oognitionis" 3a35, 38, or of conformity -- "ad quam oonformitatem sequitur oognitio rei" 3a49, or of truth-- "cognitio
est quidam veritatis effectus" 3a51 (hence knowledge is not
truth, but there can be no knowledge, even false, without some
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truth.

See Note under COGNOSCO.)

the knower and the known object

It serves as a medium to unite
"actus cognitionis est medius

inter cognoscentem et cognitum" 2lb50;
a)

in general,
created knowledge:

"omnis autem cognitio perficitur per

assimilationem ••• a.ssimilatio dicta. est causa. cognitionis"
11

3a.35, 38, where the

omnis 11 must be taken as exclusive of

God, because of the "perficitur" and "causa";
human knowledge:

11

scientia at cognitio rerum" 2bl9,

which is seen in its fullness to be a. composite act involving both sense and intellect

"cognitio nostra. quae

a. rebus initium sumit ••• primo·incipiat in sensu, secundo
perficitur in intellectu" 25a26,

11

cognitio nostra initium

a. sansu sumit" 13b7;
Note.

An indication of how closely St. Thomas united the

notions of sense-knowle.dge and intellectual knowledge is
had in 3a.35-49, where he speaks of "cognitio rei" 3a49
which is the effect of "a.da.equa.tio rei et intellectus"
(3a.47), and yet the example to which he refers ("ut dictum
est" 3a48) is of sense-knowledge -- "visus ••• cognoscit
colorem (3a.38-40).
b)

Cf. COGNOSCO, b.

sometimes,specifically,

i)

human intellectual knowledge:

"invenitur veritas

in intellectu quidem secundum quod adaequatur
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rebus quorum cognitionem habet" 20a26, "adaequa.tionem rei at intellectus ••• sequitur cognitio rei"
3a.49, even of non-being 13bll;
ii)

God's knowledge:

in this work, always of His

knowledge of created things -- it is independent
of time ... - "e.ius cognitio non concernit aliquod
tempus" l3a32;
and by it He knows truly what is in the future,
and that in its own proper nature and not merely
in its causes -- "divina. cognitio vera fuit de
rebus pluribus futuris in tempore" leal7,

11

et ideo

veram cognitionem habuit ab aeterno de rebus etia.m
in propria natura qua.mvis rerum veritates ab
aeterno non fuerint" 14a30;
and it is absolutely one -- "Deus ••• illa plura
scivit una cognitions" 14al6, 15b44, 13a27,
"quantumcumque diversa non cognoscit nisi unica.
cognitione 11 15b42, without any diversity -- "non
enim de diversis rebus diversas cognitiones habet"
13a26, 25, "non singulis suam cognitionem imnittens" 13a30.
COGNITIVUS, -A,

-u~

Cognitive, knowing.

Knowing, having the power of knowing:

5b2, 23b54, opposed to
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"appetitive." 3a29, in which instance intellectual lmowledge is
implied by "ad intellectum" below (3a34).
To know.

COGNOSCO, -ERE
a)

said of intellect,
i)

of God's intellect -- 6a49, 13a28, 29, 15b44, 17a46,
23all, 23al4;

ii)
iii)

of angelic intellect -- 9b49;
of human intellect, knowing things

3a6, 37, 5b4, 5,

6a47, 13al2, 20b23, 2lb21, •.24 (second occurrence), 25,
26, 29, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 51, 53, 22a6, 14, 15,
26a52, 26bll, 12, 17;
with truth rather than things as object -- "veritas
••• cognoscitur autem·ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum" 2lbl8, 15,
23, 24 (first occurrence), 48;
b)

said of sense,
i)

of sense knowing its object -- "sensus cognoscit
sensibile" 22a3, 8, 26a54,

11

visus cognoscit colorem"

3a40;
ii)

of sense knowing its own act, imperfectly -- "sensus
cognoscit se sentire" 2lb38, 22a4.

Note.

The body of article IX contains an important series of

occurrences of various forms of the word COGNOSCO.

Modern
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writers find in this passage some of the texts to which they most
frequently appeal in discussing St. Thomas's position on the
critical problem, as for instance the following:
Respondeo dicendum, quod veritas est in intellectu
et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu
enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, at
sicut cognita per intellectum; consequitur namque
intellectus operationem, secundum quod intellectus
reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum
quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem
cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius
actus; quae oognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur
natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus,
in cujus natura est ut rebus conformatur ••• (2lbll-28)
I answer: it must be maintained that truth is in
the intellect and in the sense, though not in the
same way. For it is in the intellect both as
naturally following upon the act of the intellect,
and as knmm by the intellect: following upon the
operation of the intellect insofar as the judgment
of the intellect is of a thing according as it is,
but known by the intellect insofar as the intellect
reflects upon its own act in not only knowing its
own act but in knowing its correspondence to the
thing. Now this cannot be known unless the nature
of the act is known, and this cannot be known unless
is known the nature of the active principle, namely
the intellect itself, whose nature it is to be
conformed to things ••• (trans. mine)
The expressions "cognita natura ipsius actus" and "nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus" seem
particularly strong, and might seem to favor what might be
called in general a "critical" stand rather than a natural realis
viewpoint on the critical problem.
But to maintain that St. Thomas is here talking of some ex-
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plicit recognition of the formal nature of our knowing power and
its act is highly questionable.

Later works like the Summa

Theologica (Ia, 16, 2) and the Contra Gentiles (I, 59), as well
as an analysis of our own experience, favor the view that he
refers simply to the concrete recognition of our mind's conformity to reality, the kind of recognition which is natural to
intellectual knowledge as such, not due to any critical selfanalysis.

(See Chapter V of the Introduction, supra, and the

references therein.)
To understand simultaneously, to unite

CO-INTELLIGO, -ERE

mentally.
"Cursus enin1 Socratis est una, sed anima quae eomponendo et
dividendo cointelligit tempus ••• diversimode intellegit cursum
Soeratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et futurum" l3al7.
Comparison.

COI..LA'fiO, -IONIS

Literally, a conferring or comparison.

Here, a comparison or

mental juxtaposition, not intellectual -- "collatio quaedam"
25b37, but under the influence of intellect, a sensory awareness
of concrete relation:

11

quam facit in homine vis eogitativa"

(25b37-38) in man, contrasted to the instinctive estinlate of
animals "loco cujus in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis'
(25b39-40), and to
(25b34).

11

judioium naturale" about the proper sensibles
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COM1ffiNSURATIO, -IONIS

Commensuration.

Proportion, correspondence, equation:
"adaequatio" in notion of truth --

11

used equivalently with

commensuratio vel adaequa-

tio intellectus ac rei" 12b30, 12bll.

COMMENSURATUM, -I

~·

Commensurate.

Known as equal, commensurate, measured, equated:

''unde secundum

P• participle of commensuro,

hoc denominatur aliquid verum, sicut et denominatur aliquid
cormnensuratum" 12bl4.
COMMUNIS., -E
a)

Common.

As an adjective,
common:· common to several senses -- "de sensibilibus communibus" 25b42, 50, as opposed to "sensibile proprium";

b)

substantively,
a common note or attribute:

11

praedicationem communis«

5a48, 49.
CO~~ARATIO,

-IONIS

Relation.

Commonly in this work,
relation:

"de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum" 9a20., 26.,

31, 15a23, 42, 23a25, 27, 23b2, 5, used in the same sense as
"convenientia" 3a40, and "ordo" 6a6 (Cicero uses it to translate
t-

'-

I

cl"~~O\l.cL-- compare "comparatur" 23b25).

Note.

Only once is it used in a sense even approaching that of
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the English

11

comparison 11 , i.e., a putting things in relation

mentally -- "res autem dicitur vera per comparationem ad intellectum divinum et humanum 11 17a31, and here also the notion of
ontological relationship predominates.
COMP.ARO, -ARE

To relate, to connect, to compare.

As with COMPARATIO, the notion is usually that of ontological
relation, not mental comparison.
passive.

is related to:

11

res aliter comparatur ad intellectum

practicum, aliter ad intellectum speculativum 11 5b24, so also 6b9,
9a33, 9bl0, 18, 23a3, 6, 23b35, 25bl7, l8b33; although it sometimes approaches the English meaning-- 15a32, 17b46, studied or
considered in relation to:

11

comparatus" 25a32, 33, 50, 53,

25b2, 13.
C01PETO, -ERE

To be attributable to, to belong to.

"Veritas secundum quod competit negationibus et defectibus"
2la20.
COMPLEMENTIDII, -I
11

Completion, fulfillment, perfection.

Complementum cujuslibet motus est in suo termino" 5bl.

CO:MPONO, -ERE

To combine, to join, to judge, to compare.

Never used in this work in a physical sense, but always of a
mental operation, of the joining of objective concepts -- "partes
definitionis ••• componi ad invicem" 7al4,
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usually in combination with a parallel form of
judge (affirmatively):

11

11

divido 11 , to

intelleotus componens et dividens" 6b2,

33, 56, 25b22, 26b21, "anima componendo at dividendo" 13al7.
Composition, judgment.

COMPOSITIO, -IONIS
1.

In the ontological order, to denote actual co-existence of
the realities signified by the subject and predicate, composition:

11

compositio quae implicatur

definitione " 7al6,

25, "veritas non consistit in compositione quae est in
rebus 11 20b50.
2.

In the intellect, the combining of two objective concepts,
judgment:

"in compositione quam facit anima" 20b51, 7a9,

19, l8a23, usually in combination with "divisio", (affirmative) judgment:
COW?REHENDO, -ERE
1.

11

compositio et divisio" 7a2, 4, 23.

To comprehend, to include.

Of a concept,
to include in its comprehension:

20bll,

to include in its application or consideration:
2.

26b43.

Of the mind, metaphorically (like APPREHENDO, q.b.),
to comprehend, to grasp, to understand:
essentiis rerum comprehensis 11

CO.MPRDLO, -ERE

"intellectus ex

26bl~

To press.

To exert physical pressure on, to press on:

"ut cum oculus

comprimitur" 25al2 (in such a way as to distort the eyeball).
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CONCEPTIO, -IONIS

Conception, notion.

The act of knowing, possessing truth:
notion, idea, conception:

19al9;

"conceptiones diversas ••• in quibus

diversae veritates inveniuntur" 13a22, 13, 2b21, 25, 24b27.
CONCIPIO, -ERE

To conceive.

To think of, to consider, to conceive:

"ut si animal rationale

mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini 11 26b25, 28, 2b20,
l9al7, 2la45.
CONFOrunTAS, -ATIS

Confornri.ty.

Literally, having the same form as.
11

Used equivalently with

adaequatio" (3a47) in the definition of truth, but less

frequently

"addit verum supra ens conformitatem sive adaequa-

tionem rei et intellectus" 3a46, 48.

That it is not to be taken

literally but rather as indicating a representative correspondeno
or proportion is clear from its use for the relation between
things and the Divine Intellect l0a22.
CONFORMO, -ARE

To conform.

Literally, to have the same form as.

Said of the relation of

knower and object of knowledge, whether or object to intellect
4bl, 10al3, 17a46 or of intellect to object 2lb28, even nonbeing -- "anima ••• conformans seipsam non enti quod est extra
animam" 2la30.
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To join.

CONJUNGO, -ERE

Used of mental composition of objective concepts, like COMPONERE.
To join mentally, to associate in a judgment:

11

conjungat partes

.

definitionis ad invicem quae conjungi non possunt" 26b26, 27
--equivalent to

11

implicat affirmationem" (26b33).

CONNOTATIO, -IONIS

Connotation, implication.

Used in the same sense as

11

importat 11 (18b21) -- "sine aliqua

connotatione principii" 18b26.
CONSENTA~~US,
11

-A, -UM

Befitting, in accord with.

Virtus ••• est habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneusn

14a52.

CONSEQUENTER

adv.

Secondarily.

Opposed to "principaliter" (18bll) -- "veritas in Deo principaliter importat aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei quae
I

est essentia ejus, at consequenter intelleetus divini ad res
crreatas" l8bl3, without the notion of consequence implied in
the root.
CONSEQUOR, -I
a)

To follow upon:

To follow, to flow from, to belong to.
11

cognitorum ••• diversas conceptiones, quas

diversae veritates in anima consequuntur" 13al4 {where it
has a slight implication of its classical meaning "to
achieve, 1111to obtain"), "sicut affectum consequentem" 3bl6,
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opposed to "cognita 11

--

"veritas ••• est in intellectu sicut

consequens actum intellectus"

2lbl4, 15, 32;

to flow from the nature of, to belong to:

"veritas non ex

ea parte consequitur creaturam qua deficiens est" lOalO,
2b50, 52, 53, 3a9, 24bl8;
b)

to follow:

used equivalently with

11

sequi 11 (25b33) -- 25b25,

32.

CONTRADICTORIUM, -I

neut. subst.

Used equivalently with

11

A contradictory (proposition).

affirmatio et negatio 11

--

"non sequitur

contradictoria esse vera" 24a9.
To accord, to fall together, to suit or befi

CONVENIO, -mE

Literally, to come together.
a)

to agree, to accord:

11

in aliquo genera convenirent"

2al7;
b)

to be the same thing:

"ergo secundum quod id est,

conveniant verum et ens" lb7;
c)

to belong to, to suit, to befit:

"distinguitur actus

essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" 4b8, 10, 3a25.

CONVENIENTIA, -AE

Fitness, accordance.

Literally, a coming together.
a)

The word expresses more than a mere relation --

11

con-

venientiam. unius antis ad aliud" 3a24 -- a certain fit-
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ness. or

aptitude~

something in a nature which appeals

to or squares with something in another nature

"con-

venientiam ergo antis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen
1

verum 111 3a33,

11

convenientiam ergo antis ad appetitum

exprimit hoc nomen 'bonum'" 3a30, 6a27;
b)

a sort of ("quaedam") agreement, accordance:

11

varitas,

cum sit quaedam convenientia intellectus et rei, non
propria invenitur in utroque" l0al8 (the cum-clause is
·adversative, not illative).
CONVERTO, -ERE

To convert, to interchange.

Used always in this work in the sense of logical conversion,

t~e

interchanging of subject and predicate in a proposition -- "verum
••• convertitur cum ante" 6al7, 19, 25, 2al, 35, 39, 4b47, "cum
verum et ens convertantur" l7a38.
CORPORALIS, -E

Bodily, corporeal.

"Sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9.
CORPUS, -ORIS

Body.

Not defined or analysed in this work.
which has dimensions --

11

It has reference to a body

diversorum corporum sunt dimensiones

diversae" 9b28, the internal dimensions being three in number
--

11

mensuratur corpus mansura intrinseoa, sicut linea, vel

superf~cie,

vel profunditate 11 l2bl5; it is changeable -- "corpus
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esse mutabile" 16bl7; and cannot be God -- 24a53, 56, 24bl.
Correspondence.

CORRESPONDENTIA, -AE

Used like "adaequatio" in the formal definition of truth -- "quae
quidam correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur, et
in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur" 3a43.
CORRESPONDO, -ERE
Equivalent to

To correspond.
11

adaequetur" -- 3b50, 6b42, implying at least the

suitability for assimilation -- "ut ens intellectui

correspondea~

3a42.
CORR~TO,

a)

-ERE

To corrupt.

active.

To corrupt, to destroy:

"dispositio corrumpens"

4a8;
b)

passive.
be:

14bl9, 51.

CORRli'PTIO, -IONIS
a)

opposed to "perpetuum esse" (l4b8), to cease to

Corruption, change.

Substantial change, ceasing to be, corruption:

"corruptionem

individui" 14b20, 49;
b)

accidental change:

"corruptionem quantum ad accidentia •••

manente re" 18a6.
CREDO, -ERE

To believe, to opine.

Not said of faith, whether human or supernatural, but of opinion,
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to opine, to judge:

"corpus ••• aliquos in errorem

crederetur unitas" 24b3.

ind~,

••• ut
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D

Dei'ect, lack.

DEFECTUS, -US

Lack, imperi'ection, absence of something which ought to be:
used equivalently with "negatio" 2la21, 23, 24, 23al3, with
"privatio" 23al8, with ttdei'ormitas" 20b43, 46,47;
(moral) defect:

"rationem dei'ectus, et in hoc concipit rationem

mali "2la45, "defectus in actu fornicationis 11 20b35;
(physical) dei'ect:

"defectum intrinsecus vel extrinsecus im-

pedimentum; unde sensus ••• nisi sit impedimentum in organo, vel
in madio" 25b45;
lack of similarity:

ndefectum, in quo i'ormaliter ratio i'alsitati

consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit 11 24a25, 1012.
To cease, to be defective.

DEFICIO, -ERE
1.

To cease to exist:

"perpetuum et incorruptibile ••• quae

nunquam inceperunt nee deficient" 14bl3;
2.

pres. part. defective, imperfect, falling short of', incomplete:

11

creatura in quantum deficiens est" 10a9, 11, 2la44.

DEI<'Il\TITIO, -IONIS
a)

In logical sense,
definition:

b)

Definition.

11

dei'initio veri" 3b24, 36, 37;

mental, rather than verbal, dei'inition, our conception or
mental expression of ''quod quid est",
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concept, notion:

11

intellectus ••• conciperet quasi

definitionem asini 11 26b23, 25, 26, 28, 32;
opposed to judgment,
simple apprehension:

"in intellectu formante definitiones 11

7a7, 8, 10, 11, 13;
c)

ambiguously, either (a) or (b) -- 7al4, 18, 24.

DEMONSTRABILIS, -E

Demonstrable.

Being susceptible of strict proof, as opposed to

11

investigando 11

(2bl6) -- nin demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in
aliqua principia per se nota" 2bl4.

DEMONSTRO, -ARE

To show forth.

To manifest, to show forth:

11

sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes

rumram quae eis non subest 11 23a39, 25a55.
Note.

1'he word is used only twice in this work, and then not

in its usual significance of logical demonstration but in its
root meaning.

DEPREHENDO, -ERE

To be aware of, to note.

"per speciem boni ••• anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus,
et in hoc concipit rationem mali" 2la44.

DESIGNO, -.ARE
11

To designate, to mean.

aequalitas in divinis quandoque rationem quae designat

distinctionem personalem" 19a3.
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Note.

The word differs from SIGNIFICO by having a greater im-

plication of intrinsic meaning, whereas the latter connotes more
an arbitrary or external sign.
It must be maintained that.

DICENDu'M QUOD

Introduces St. Thomas's own position (see OBJICIO, Note).
DH':B'ERENTIA, -AE
a)

Difference.

Strictly, as one of the five predicables of logic,
(logical) difference:

"verum, propria loquendo, non potest

esse differentia entis 11 23b26, "ens enim non habet aliquam
differentiam" 23b27, 2b28, 43,

11

ut differentia ad genus"

23b36;
b)

in a loose sense of (a) -- "quodammodo" (23b36) 23b30.

DIGESTA, -ORUM

Digests, Pandects.

"in principio Digestorum" 14a56.
Note.

The reference is to the code of Justinian, as is clear

from the identity of the definition of justice given there.
Cf. Corpus Juris Civilis, Justiniani Digesta (ed. P. Krueger),
apud Weidmannos, Berolini, 1928, I, 29b.
DISPONO, -ERE

To modify.

passive.
such:

To be modified, to receive an impression, to become

"visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris,

cognoscit colorem11 3a39, "sensus disponitur" 25a54.
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DISPOSITIO, -IONIS
a)

Disposition, condition.

In general,
any condition, state, quality or attribute:
inducere" 14b34,

11

11

dispositionem

dispositio enunciabitur" l4b34, "res •••

divino intellectui conformatur, qui eam cognoscit ut est
secundum quamcumque dispositionem" l7a47,

11

dispositio vel

corrumpens vel minuens" 4a8;
order, arrangement:

11

dispositio ibi non accipitur secundum

quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat
quemdam ordinem" 4all;
b)

more specifically,
i)

an attribute not really distinct:

"verum est dis-

positio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam" 4a2;
ii)

11

real quality or condition:

dispositiones :materiales

quae sunt causae corruptionis" 14b48, "dispositio
rerumn 25bl5;
determination of a sense power, impression:

"sensus

••• dispositionem suam intellectui demonstrat 11 25a54,
25bl4.
DISSIM.ILITUDO, •ItHS

Dissimilarity.

Contrasted with SIMILITUDO (q.v.) -- 24a27, 35, 46, 49.
DISTINCTIO, -IONIS
a)

Distinction.

real distinction or difference:

11

realis distinctio 11 19a 7,
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under which is included the distinction between Persons of
the Blessed Trinity --

11

distinotionem personalem, sicut cum

dicimus quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales" 19a3, 12;
b)

mental distinction, difference of concept:

"non realis •••

distinctio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dicimus sapientiam
et bonitatem divinam esse aequales" 19a9.
To distinguish, to conceive as different.

DISTINGUO, -ERE
passive.
a)

to be conceived as differing in reality:

11

etsi personae

realiter ab invicem distinguantur, non tamen ab esse
distinguuntur" 4b21, 23, "tres illae personae divinae re
distinguantur" 4bl8, "ens, verum, unum et bonum ••• non •••
in rebus creatis distinguantur etiam realiter" 4b30, 35;
b)

to be conceived as only differing mentally, in conception:

"ens, verum, unum et bonum ••• in Deo ratione

distinguuntur" 4b29.
DIVERSIFICO, -ARE

To diversify, to make multiple.

Contrasted with "una" (13a9) -DIVISIO, -IONIS
a)

11

diversificatur veritas" l3al0.

Division.

Literally, in the ontological order,
state of physical division or distinction:

"ens ••• secundum

divisionem unius ab altero, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen
'aliquid'" 3al6;
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b)

metaphorically, applied to the recognition of discrepancy of
objective concepts,
(negative) judgment:

see COMPOSITIO, 2, with which it is

always paired.
DIVIDO, -ERE

To divide.

Always metaphorically, to denote the separation of objective
concepts in the mind,
to judge (negatively):
paired in contrast.

see COMPONO, with which it is always

,
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E

Effect.

EFFECTUS, US

Of truth, as the result of the action of the object upon the
intellect

"veritas ••• ad intellectum divinum comparatur quasi

ad causam, ad humanum autem ad affectum" 9a35; 18al8.
EFFICIENS, -EliTIS

Efficient.

In contrast to "exemplaris 11

--

"non esse extra animam existens

non est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris" 2la32.
Note.

In 2la35 it is preferable to omit "exemplari" as do the

Vives edition and three of the four Paris codices used for it
(B, C, D), or else amend the text to read "(non)de causa
exemplari [sed) efficiente".
Able to choose.

ELECTIVUS, -A, -UM

"veritas dicitur ••• de homine, qui est eleotivus orationem
suarum 11 7a30.
Note.

The suffix

11

-ivusn usually denotes ability to do the

action, with a connotation of actual performance which may vary
for different words.
ENS,

~NTIS

(neuter adjectival substantive
classical)

a)

Note.

from~,~,

not

Being.

The term is never formally defined or analyzed in

this work.

The derivation of the term is noted as indicating
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that the notion of existence is prominent --

"'~'

sumitur

ab actu essendi" 3a6, "ratio autem antis ab actu essendi
sumitur" 4b8; yet except for a few oases in which an actually
existing thing is meant (cf. b, infra), the term as used
throughout the work implies simply that to which existence is
proper -- "quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens" 2b30 (cf.
A. :Marc, pp. 87-90 of "L'Idee de l'Atren, Archives de

Philosophie, 1933, X, 1-144).
(In creatures) composition of essence and existence:

"in

omni ente ••• essentia ejus secundum quam esse dioi turn 3a2,
"cum dicitur, 'Diversum est esse et quod est', distinguitur
actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" (4b6);
b)

by emphasis,
actually existing being:
plural.

6a25, 15a32 (twice), 43 (twice);

the hierarchy of existing beings:

"illa quae sunt

perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales"
2lb43;
c)

in the mental order,
i)

the notion or idea of being:

"omnes aliae

oo~cep

tiones intelleetus accipiuntur ex additione ad

~"

2b26 (twice), "ens non potest esse genus" 2b32, 34,
43, 45, 4b4, 13, 23b26 (twice), 29.
ii)

the term or name being:

"nomen 'res• ••• in hoc differt

ab ante" 3a4, nverum et ens convertuntur" 17a38,
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6a17,

"'~'

sumi tur ab actu essendi" 3a6, 4a36

(second occurrence).
ENTITAS, -ATIS

(not classical)

Being.

The abstract term corresponding to the concrete ENS:

"diversi

gradus entitatis" 2b39, "ratio entitatis" 15b30, 3a49, 4a24,
4bl, 10a39;
used in parallel with the abstract "veritas" 9al9, 9b4, 20a41,
55, 20bl2.
Note.

The term is not the abstract of "esse", existence.

ENUNTIABILE, -IS

neut. subst.

Enuntiable.

The formal object of a judgment, an unasserted judgment, the
objective identity or difference of subject and predicate -"omnium istorum enuntiabilium, Patrem esse vel generare, Filium
esse vel esse genitum" 15bl6;
known by God, but not through separate judgments -- "scivit Deus
plura enuntiabilia, sed taman illa plura scivit una cognitione"
14al4, 12b55;
used once of truth precisely as an object of judgment of a
created intellect -- 12b48.
ENUNTIA'I'IO, -IONIS

1.

Proposition.

The external, verbal expression of a judgment, proposition:
"enuntiatio est signum intellectus" 24b27, 12b27,

17a~9;
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equivalent to "propositio 11 (4a45) 4a44, 17a57 (in reply to
11

argument where

oratio 11 , "enuntiatio" and "propositio 11 are

all used in same meaning);
equivalent to
2.

11

oratio" 13a41, 50;

equivalent to ENLWTIABILE -- 14a7, 17b41, 44, 47.

EN1JNTIO, -ARE
1.

To declare.

Literally,
to predicate, to pronounce:

2.

14b37, 24a40;

metaphorically, by simply being such rather than by formal
declaration,
to manifest:

"sensus ••• non possunt omnino enuntiare nisi

affectionem sua.m" 25bl.
ESSE

infin. of

~, ~~

fui.

To be, existence.

1.

Used frequently simply as the infinitive of the

2.

As a noun,
existence, the act of being, to be:
per

quam~

copula~·

"forma uniuscujusque,

habet" 24b8, 3b35, 14b16, 18, 17a41, 20a40,

23bl7, 15b37, "per intellectum divinum eas in esse producentem11 9a29, explicitly equivalent to "actus essendi" 4b6,
used equivalently with the gerund

i)

11

essendi" 4al8;

opposed to "secundum rationem 11 (16b56, 17a3), by
emphasis,
reality, extra-mental existence:

"remanet idem
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secundum rationem sed non
ii)

secundum~"

16b56, 17a3;

not really distinct from the Persons in God

~-

4b22,

24, 15bl4, but really distinct from the created
essence -- "nulla res est suum esse 11 9b40.
Note.

From the explicit statement in the same paragraph that

"nulla res est suum esse 11 (9b40), it is clear that

11

esse com-

pletum" must mean exi,stence which is complemented (by composition
with essence) when it belongs to things actually existing in the
universe -- "de rebus quae habent esse completum in natura"
9b38.
ESSENDI

(gerund of ~· ~· not classical)

Existence.

The genitive case of the verbal noun ESSE, with which it is
equivalently used 4b7, 15, "diversi modus essendi 11 2b40, 46.
ESSENT IA, -AE
Yfuat a thing is:

Essence.
"hoc nomen 'res' exprimit quidditatem siva

essentiam entis 11 3a8, "in omni ente ••• essentia ejus secundum
quam esse dicitur" 3a2,
the determinate nature of a thing:

"forma est invariabili

essentia consistens" 16bl9, as opposed to what is merely incidental ( 11 accidentalis 11 9a22) -- "res in sua essentia permaneretu 9a25;
contrasted with "accidentia 11

--

"intima rei cognoscit; est enim

intelligere ••• sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia
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cognoscunt, solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertinet"
26a55, 26b, but used even of accidents, namely of our operative
powers (22a6, 11) -- "sensus non cognoscit essentiam. suam" 22a6,
equivalent to NATURA (cf. 2, a, 3.v.) 2lb45, 53, 55, 56, 22a3, 6;
used of the

s~~le

Divine Essence -- 13a24, 15b26, 31, 18bl0, 13,

16, 21, 19al5.
(PER) ESSEN'I'IAM
ESSE11TIALIS, -E

see

PE.'R ESSE1"T lAM.
Essential.

Pertaining to the essence, essential:

contrasted with

11

acciden-

talia" (l8a5, 9) -- "immutabilis quantum ad essentialia rei
manente re" 17b56, 57, 18a5, equivalent to "per se" (23b4) -23b3.
ESSENTIALITER
a)

(not classical)

Essentially.

Essentially, naturally, necessarily;

11

quaelibet natura

essentialiter est ens" 2b30;
b)

opposed to "personali ter" ( 18a27),
(predicated) as pertaining to the simple Essence of God:
"esse in divinis nonnisi essentialiter dicitur," 15bl5,
18a27, 18b38, 40.

(The expression is from st. Augustine,

De Trinitate, VII, 2, PL 42, 936.)
EVIDENTIA, -AE

Evidence.

The perspicuity proper to cogent argument:

11

ad cujus evidentiam

r
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sciendum est" 16b28.

EXCEDO, -ERE

To exceed, to go beyond.

In a logical sense, referring to the extension of the concept
of truth, not to its comprehension (as is clear from 2b32-36)
"non excedit nee exceditur ab ente" 4b4.
EXEMPLA...!{, -IS

Exemplar.

The model or pattern of things in the (divine) mind:
per quam res

"formam,

imitentur exemplar divinae artis 11 20a47, "una

veritas in exemplari" 10a47.
EXEMPL.ARIS, -E

Exemplary.

Contrasted with "efficiens" (2la32) 2la33.
Note.

For "causa exemplari efficiente" 2la35, see EFFICIENS,

Note s.v.
EXElv:PLARITER

By way of exemplary causality.

"a veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intellectum nostrum veritas
EX'~PLO,

-ARE

passive.

primo~um

principiorum11 9b50.

To be the exemplary cause of.
To be derived or caused by way of exemplary causality,

to have one's exemplary cause in:

equivalent to "derivatur

exemplariter 11 (8a43) in the argument (art. VI, Contra, 2) to
which reply is being made -- "rebus propria exemplatis ab in-
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tellectu divino" 10a27, 31,
equivalent to

11

imitandi exemplar divinum 11 (8b33) in the argument

being answered (art. VI, Contra, 6) -- "res exemplentur difformiter a veritate divina" 10a4l, 46;
11

sicut similitudo faciei resultat in speculo" (l0b4-5) -- 10b2.

EXISTENS, -ENTIS
a)

Existing.

With emphasis on actuality or reality of existence,
actually existing:

"rei existentis extra animam11 6b45, 3b48,

20a34, 40, 45, 23al7, 23b50;
said even of (real) privations -- "non esse extra anima.m
existens 11 2la32, and of falsity --

11

falsitatem in rebus

existentem" 24al;
b)

non-emphatically, equivalent to the English participle (not
noun) ""being",
baing, existing:

11

Socrate existente albo 11 l7bl6, 11, l4b50,

l5bl, 23a52.
EXISTENT IA, ...AE

Existence.

The fact of existence:

11

veritas quae in anina causatur a rebus

••• sequitur ••• existentiam rerum" 6a40.
EXISTI.HATIO, -IONIS
a)

£stimate.

In intellect,
estimate, notion, idea:

11

sicut res ••• faciunt veram existima ...
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tionem in intellectu vel falsa.m" 25a39, 23b47, 53, 25b8, 14;
b)

in sense knowledge of brute animals,
sense-judgment, evaluation:

"sensus autem judicium ••• existi-

matio naturalis; et sic judicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus
comrnunibus et de sensibilibus per accidens'' 25b40.
EXISTDW, -ARE

To think, to opine.

"quida.m existimaverunt Deum esse corpus" 24a53, 55.
EXTERIOR, -IS

Exterior, external.

"sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt 11
26a54.
Note.

This wording and the context suggest that "exteriora

accidentia" are to be contrasted not only with

11

essentiam rei"

(26a55), but also with certain accidents, (internal) properties
known only to the intellect.
EXTREl\mM, -I

Bxtreme, term.

The term or extreme of a relation:

"in hac adaequatione vel

commensuratione intellectus ac rei non requiritur quod utrumque
extremorum sit in actu" 12b31.
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FACIO, -ERE
To

To make.

make~

to cause efficiently (because of the "causa efficiens"
2la28, 29 ~ "falsam. faci t apprehensionem" 23a56.

2la32):

FALLACIA (ACCIDENTIS)

see

FALLO, -ERE

ACCIDENS, 3 •

To deceive.

"cum 'fallere' dico significo actionem quamdam defectum inducentem" 24al3, 14, "at ideo hoc quod dico 'fallere' ••• quantum ad id
quod importat defectum, in quo for.maliter ratio falsitatis consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit"

24a22~ 43~

"judicium sensus

fallitur" 25b52.

FALSITAS, -ATIS

:F'alsity •

. Opposed to VERITAS (q.v.) in all its various uses.
a)

In dialectical portions of the

work~

without implying a

settled meaning, e.g. 24b3l;
b)

Opposed to "veritas rerum" -- "falsitas in rebus existens
23b57~

c)

17a36,

25a47~

48, 52;

opposed to "veritas" in its most proper and formal
sense -- "sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et
intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequalitate

11

23a2, "defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis

consistit~

ex dissimilitudine surgit 11 24a26, 17a51, 17b9,

r
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'i

14, 15, 22, 23a49, 50, 51, 24a30, 25a42, 25b53, 26b20,
45.
F'alse.

F'ALSUS, -A, -UM

Opposed to VERUS (q.v.) in all its uses.
a)

As an adjective,
false, untrue:
i)

in the representative order -6a42, 7a8, 31,

11

11

falsa oratio"

falsa definitio" 26b30, 32,

"affirmatio falsa" 26b34, "intellectus falsus"
6a42, 7a9, 17, 26, 24a4, 7;
ii)

in the order of reality -- "res falsae dicuntur
quae natae sunt videri quae non aunt, aut qualia
non sunt" Sal, "res dicitur falsa secundum quod
nata est fallere 11 24al2, 22al7, 23a41, "per comparationem ad intellectum divinum nulla res
potest esse falsa" 23a27, "aurum falsum" 23a45
see AURUM FAI. SUM;

b)

used in a more substantive way, in a quasi-abstract sens
false, the false, falsity:

"ipsa veritas creata non

habet aliquid simile falso" 10a6, 7, 8, "malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum 11 24b21, 5a38,
5bl9, 6b28.
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FINIS, -IS

End.

1.

Ending, termination:

nveritas clauditur principia et finelf

13a41, 49.
2.

End, purpose:

F'orm.

FORMA, -AE

1.

24bl0, 11, 19, 29.

In a very broad sense,
attribute, qualification, property:

"equivalent to "dis-

positio11 (17a47) -- "veritas est forma maxime generalis,
cum verum et ens convertantur" 17a37, 43,

11

res ••• sub qua-

cumque forma existens 11 23a17, 14b39, 46, 16b17, 18, 21.
2.

Yhysical form, real determining principle:
a)

non-committal -- "res per formam suam imitantur artem
divini intellectus 11 20a35, 46, 20bl5, 26, 24bl5;

b)

substantial form:

"per quam formam etiam unaquaeque

res esse habet" 20a39, l4b40, 42, 17a41, 23b42, 43,
24b7;
c)

accidental form, intrinsic and real accident:

op-

posed to that by extrinsic denomination -- 9b2, 6,
opposed to "locus" (16b42) -- "forma inhaerens"
16b50;
i)

generically considered -- "forma generalis •••
color 11 16b53, '17a1;

ii)

specifically-- "forma specialis •• albedo"
16b53, 54.
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Formally.

FORNlALITER
Formally~

in the £ull and most proper sense:

11

in quo formaliter

ratio falsitatis consistit" 24a26.
FORY.ATIO~

F'ormation.

-IONIS

(Representative) making or

forming~

quidditatum ab intellectu"

25b22~

formation:

11

formatio •••

24;

likewise, of sense apprehensions -- 25b31.
To base (upon), to substantiate (in).

FUNDO,-ARE
Equivalent to

11

substantificatur" in the argument (art. X, arg. 3)

to which reply is being made -- "oportet falsitatem in rebus
existentem supra veritatem fundari 11 24a2.
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-IONIS

Gffi~ERATIO,
11

The act of generation, begetting.

generatio ad hoc est, secundum Philosophum, ut salvetur per-

petuum esse in specie" 14bl4, 15a36.
GENUS, -ERIS
a)

Genus, class.

In a broad and loose sense ("largo modo accipiendo genus"
lOblO),
class, kind:

"veritas prima est quodammodo de genera animae

humanae, largo modo accipiendo genus" l0b9-l0, 11, ·2b42, 48;
b)

strictly, as one of the predicables of logic, genus:

11

est in

genera qualitatis 11 4al2, 14b53, "per modum quo differentia
additur generi" 2b28, 32, 23b37.
GIGNO, -ERE

To generate, to produce, to cause.

Metaphorically, of the action of the object on the mind -- "res
••• sui notitiam in anima gignit" 24bl7.

GRADUS, -US

Grade, degree.

"diversi gradus entitatis 11 2b39.
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HABITUDO,
11

-nns

Relationship.

veritas ••• superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum 11

20a42, 56, 20b5.
Note.

The above translation is confirmed on the basis of

"referri" (20b2).
F~ITUS,

a)

-US

Habit.

Loosely, in a sense approaching the root meaning of "a
having",
natural power and tendency to act in a certain way:

"unde

et intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur" 26bl3;
b)

strictly, as the genus of virtus,
habit, (acquired) tendency to act in a certain way:

"virtus

est habitus in modum. naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a51.
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DflAGINATIO, -IONIS

I!na.gination.

"vis apprehensiva quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem ••• re
absente, sicut imaginatio" 26a2, 5, 53.
To imitate.

IMITOR, -ARI

"res formam habet, artem di vini intellectus imi tatur" 24bl6, 18.,
18b43, 20a27, 35, 46.
Note.

The word is used only of the relation of things to intel-

lect, and only· to the Divine Intellect.
IYMITTENS, -ENTIS

Imparting, sending to.

"[Deus) per essentiam suam cognoscit, non singulis suam cognitione.m immittens" 13a30.
Note.

The literal meaning of this word and its use here in the

active voice suggest an emphasis on the fact that God's knowledge
unlike human knowledge, in no way depends on or is caused by
creatures.
HiffirlUTABILIS, -E
See

MD~ABILIS,

IMPLEO, -ERE

Unchangeable, immutable.
to the various senses of which it is opposed.
To fulfill, to measure up to.

"res naturalis ••• dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est
ordinate. per intellectum divinum 11 5b48, 17b39.
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To implicate, to involve.

IMPLICO, -ARE
passive.
a)

involved:

"ipse defectus in actu fornicationis impli-

catus11 20b36;
b)

intended, implied:

11 compositio quae implicatur •••

definitionibus rerum" 7al6, 25.
Note.

The meaning is stronger than that of the English word

"implied", sometimes almost equivalent to "asserted".
To connote.

D.1PORTO, -ARE

To involve, to imply, to connote:

11

nullam principii rationem

importat" 18b2l, 7, 36, 37, 12bl2, l9a2, 19al3, 24a23, 25.
Note.

The meaning is perhaps not as strong as that of IMPLICO,

although often stronger than that of the English "i:rnplied".

St.

Thomas suggests "connote" by the equivalent phrase "sine aliqua
connotatione principii" (18b26).
IN ACTU

see

ACTUS, 1.
In itself.

IN SE

Absolutely, without reference to others:

in contrast to "in

ordine ad aliud" (2b54), equivalent to "absolute" (3al, 10) -2b52.

l

INAEQUALITAS, •ATIS

Inequality, dissimilarity.

--------------1-·--L--it--er_a__l_ly
__, __in__a_n___i_l_l_u_st__r_a_t_i_on---f-r-om---a-1-g-eb__r_a_,________________
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inequality:
2.

17b8.

Loosely,
non-correspondence, dissimilarity:

"sicut veritas consistit

in adaequatione rei et intellectus, ita falsitas consistit
in eorum inaequalitate 11 23a2, 29.
INDEX, -ICIS
11

Indication, manifestation.

illam formam cujus indicia e:x:terius ostenduntur per sensibiles

qualitates 11 23b44.
INDICATIVUS, -A, -UM

Indicative, representative.

Equivalent to "representativum alterius rei" (25b4) -- "sensus
enim et est res quaedam in se, et est indicativus alterius
rei" 25a49.
INDIVISIO, -IONIS

(State of) undividedness, absence of

divisi~

"indivisio, et hanc e:x:primit hoc nomen 'unum'; nihil enim est
aliud 'unum' quam ens indivisum" 3al0 -- involving the notion of
"in se" (3a20) in contrast to

11

divisionem unius ab altero •••

'aliquid'" (3al7).
INDUCO, -ERE
1.

To bring in, to induce.

To induce, to bring about, to be the (inadequate) cause of:
11

illa quae nata sunt contrarium dispositionem inducere"

l4b35, 24al5, 42, 24b3 (twice).
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2.

To bring in, to introduce:

"cum definitione Philosophi

supra inducta" 3b38, 5b53, 25a56.
The lower bodies.

INFERIORA, -ORUM

"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus"
26al3 -- ostensibly here the lower heavenly bodies and the
things of earth.
Indefinite.

IliJFilGTUS, -A, -UM

Not actually infinite, but potentially, i.e., implying not
capacity for achieving actual infinity but simply unlimited
potency, hence,
indefinite(ly):

"in infinitum iretur" 2bl7,

11

in infinitum

procedere in rebus" l5al2, 16, 37;
indefinilte (in number):

"possent esse infinitae relationes in

eodem" l5a35.
INI<'LECTO, -ERE
Equivalent to

To reflect.
11

reflectitur 11 (2lb20) --

11

intellectus inflectitur

in seipsum, et intelligit se sicut et alias res" l7b30.
INNATUS, -A, -UM

Innate, connatural.

"in intellectum angelicum species rerum innatae" 9b48.
Note.

The word cannot be taken in the literal sense of "inborn"

here, obviously, for it is applied only to angels and not to men
or animals.
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INQUIRO, -ERE
11

To investigate, to examine.

ulterius intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensis diversi-

mode negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b3.

INSENSIBILIS, -E

Unable to sense, non-sensory.

"potentiae naturales insensibiles ••• sicut ignis" 22al2,
"de.finitio falsa ••• quod aliquod animal est insensibile" 7al5, 17.
Note.

The term is not the opposite of "sensibile 11 (i.e., able
11

to be sensed), but of

sensitivus 11 (i.e., sensory, able to

sense).

INTELLECTUALIS, -E

Int ell actual.

Endowed with intellect (angelic or human):

"substantiae intel-

lectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa 11 2lb44,
22al.

INTELLECTUS, -US
1.

a)

Intellect.

The power of knowing essence:

"solus autem intellectus

ad essentiam rei pertingit" 26a56.

Very frequent in

this work, usually of the human intellect, but often of
God's intellect, sometimes of both-- "adaequationis ad
intellectum humanum vel divinum" 20a43, once of angel's
intellect --

11

intellectum angelicum 11 9b47;

of intellect as causing things:
causat res" 5b25, 26;

"intellectus practicus

r--------------------------------------------~
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of intellect as determined or actuated by things:
"intellectus speculativus ••• est quodammodo motus a
rebus" 5b26, 29;
b)

sometimes connoting the power as in act -- "veritas in
intellectu" l2b26, 27, 17a30, 17bl0, 12, l8al8;

c)

the activitating part of the intellect,
acting intellect:

"intellectus agens describatur quo

est omnia facere 11 6a50, 3b55, 56;
d)

the receptive part of the intellect,
passive, or possible, intellect:

"et intellectus

possibilis quo est omnia fieri" 6a52 (but Cf. ACTIVUS,
~).

Note.

St. Thomas suggests an etymological derivation, "nomen

intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est
enim intelligere quasi intus legere" 26a51.
derivation is rather from "inter" and
2.

11

The classical

legere 11 •

Denoting the intellect precisely as actuated, not merely as
in 1, b, supra (cf. De Veritate XVII, 1 corp.),
a)

idea, concept:

"voces eodem modo ••• sicut intellectus

(nom. plur.] quos significant" 7a35, naddetur in intellectu veritatis ratio principii" 18b31 (compare flcompositio intellectuum11 in SUllllJlB. Theologica, Ia, 17, 3
Sed Contra):
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b)

judgment:

"nomen intellectus compositi, scilicet prout

'
signifioat affirma.tionem propositionis 11 3b32, "enuntiatio
est signum intellectus 11 24b28, 12b28, "eadem res quae
significatur illis tribus propositionibus, non tamen est
idem intellectus earum" 18a22, 23, 25.
c)

reasoning:

"Alio modo potest accipi intellectus com-

muniter, secundum quod ad omnes operationes se extendit,
et sic comprehendit opinionem et ratiocinationem" 26b41.
INTELLIGENTIA, -AE

Understanding.

The act of intellection:
INTELLIGIBILIS, -E

6b26.

Pertaining to intellection.

"veritas prima est quodammodo de genera animae largo modo accipiendo genus, secundum quod omnia intelligibilia vel incorporalia unius generis esse dicuntur" lObll, where it includes
both the notion of able to understand and that of able to be
understood (intelligible);
11

intelligibile lumen" 10a27 see Lillv'lEN INTELLIGIBILE.

INTEILIGO, -ERE

a)

To understand.

The proper action of the intellect --

11

dicimur propria

intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditatem rerum, vel cum
intelligimus ea quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis
rerum quidditatibus" 26b7, 9, 5bll;
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"intelligere quasi intus l'egere" 26a52 see INTELLECTUS, 1.,
Note;
b)

to know intellectually, to understand:

"ali quid intelligi

sine altero" 3b41., 43, "intelligere se non esse" 13b40.
Notion, concept.

INTE1TT IO, -IONIS

"intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quod8lllill.odo ut
differentia ad genus" 23b33, 34, 35, 36.
Inmost depths, internal nature, essence.

INT Uf.A., -ORUM

Equivalent to

11

essentiam 11 (26a55) --

11

intellectus ••• intim.a.

rei cognoscit 11 26a51.
To investigate, to analyze.

INVESTIGO, -ARE

The method proper to first philosophy, as opposed to strict
demonstration

11

in demonstrabilibus 11 (2bl4) -- "ita investigando

quid est unumquodque" 2bl6.
IRRATIOUALIS, -E

Irrational.

Not possessed of the power of reasoning (not merely deprived of
the active exercise of the power):

rtanimal irrationale" 26b29,

31.
Rabbi Isaac Israeli.

ISAAC
Note.

This Jewish philosopher and doctor lived in E&vpt

c. 845-940.

He wrote in Arabic, but a Latin translation of his

r
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writings by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) was possessed by the
scholastics and was available in the time of st. Thomas.

Several

extant thirteenth century MSS. are listed by J. T. Muckle
("Isaac Israeli Liber de Definicionibus", Archives d 1 histoire
doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen ~ge, 1938, XI, 299-340) •.
However, the exact words as given by St. Thomas do not appear
in that text, being only approximated in one place (ibid., 307),
whereas his own definition

11

veritas est quod est 11 appears

frequently (ibid., 321, 322, 333).

"et sic dicit Isaac, quod

'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus'" 3b6.

Cf. J. T.

:Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth", .Archives
d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen 1ge, 1933, VIII,
5-8.

!
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J
JlJDICHJM, -I

1.

Judgment, perception.

Properly, referring to the intellect's own activity,
judgment:

"sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa,

tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei"
6b49, 52, "secundum quod judicium intellectus est de re
secundum quod est" 2lbl7, 23a51, 25!:>24.
2.

Analogically, of the operations of the sense powers,
perception, natural estimate, sense-judgment:

"sensus •••

judicium quod ex formations praedicta consequitur; prout
scilicet ex apprehensions tali natum est sequi tale
judicium" 25b31-33, 34, "judicium sensus est de re secundum
quod est" 2lb33, "sensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis
semper est verum11 25b47, Hin sensibilibus· conununibus et
per accidens interdum judicium sensus fallitur 11 25b51, 52.
JUDICO, -.ARE

1.

To judge, to perceive.

Properly, of the intellect,
to judge:

"tunc autem judicat intellectus de re apprehensa,

quando dicit quod aliquid est vel non est, quod est intellectus componentis et dividentis" 6b53, 48, 9b45, 52, 53,
56, 2la38, 25bl0, "anima vero in quantum de rebus judicat
non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit" 23a53.
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2.

Analogically. of sensory apprehension,
to perceive, to sense:

"sensus vera judicat de rebus"

2lb36, 37, 25a44, 25b27,

11

et sic judicat vis sensitiva de

sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens"
25b41.

JUS. JURIS

Right.

What belongs to someone:

11

unicuique jus suum tribuens 11 14b2.

(No attempt is made at further definition or clarification.)

JUSTITIA, -AE

Justice.

"justitia est 'constans et perpetua voluntas unicuique jus suum
tribuens'" 14bl, 4,
14a45.

11

justitia di vina 11 14a44,

11

justitia humana 11

r
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LOCUS, -I

Place.

"locus est inunutabilis terminus continentis 11 16b45 (Aristotle,
Phys., IV, 4, 212a20), explicitly extrinsic-- "est extrinsecum ..
••• sicut locus non dicitur moveri quando aliquid secundum locum
movetur" 16b42, 43, 12bl7, "per localem motum non dicitur esse
successio locorum in uno locate, sed magis successio locatorum
in uno loco" 16b47, 49.
LUMEN, -INIS

a)

Light, illumination, intelligence.

Of God,
(divine) intelligence:

b)

"a lumina divino 11 10a27;

of created intellects, with "intelligibile 11 ,
intelligence, light of intelligibility, illumination of the
acting intellect:

Note.

10a27 (first occurrence), 29.

The word is used only in a preliminary dialectical

argument (art. IV, Contra, 2) from the pseudo•Dionysius ( 11 ut
patet per Dionisium" 8a46) and in reply to the same.

Further-

more, it is always used with the adjective "intelligibile" when
said of creatures.

The phrase would be translated literally

"intelligible light", "light able to be understood", but this is
meaningless in the context.

Use of this and similar expressions

in st. Thomas's commentary In Boetium

~

Trinitate (I,l) as

referring to the action of the acting, or agent, intellect
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suggest the meaning given above for the present case.

This is

born out by the phrases "vim manifestandi habetn (8a44) and
11

ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum" (DeVer. IX, 1).

It

is analogous when applied to Divine and human intellectual
illumination, by proper analogy -- "a lumina divino, tamen lumen
propria dicitur etiam de intelligibilibus luminibus creatis •••
ideo non dicimus unum lumen" 10a27 (second occurrence), 28, 29,
33.

s.

Cf. J. Guillet, O.P., "La lumiere intellectuelle d'apr~s
Thomas 11 , Archives d'histoire doctrinale at litt19raire du

moyen lge, 1927, II, 79-88.
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see

:MAJOR M1JNDUS

]JiUNDUS MAJOR.

I'flALU.M, -I

a)

Bad, evil.
As an adjective --

11

quamvis istum fornicari sit malum" 4a56,

2la47;
b)

used in a more substantive way,
i)

in a quasi-abstract sense,
the bad, badness:

"malum est in rebus" 5bl8, 24bl9,

"ratio boni et mali" 20b55, 2la46 (first occurrence);
ii)

more concretely,
bad, bad thing:
11

"malum non sit a Deott 2la37, 38, 39,

rna.lum non agit in animam nisi per speciem boni"

2la42, 46 (second occurrence).
:MANEO, -ERE

To remain (in existence), to last.

"prima perfectio est forma uniuscujusque per quam habet esse,
unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet 11 24b9.
A~T~~IA,

a)

-AE

Matter.

(Prime) matter, undifferentiated matter:

11

unitas per se

attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus
formae unitatis, sed per remotionem formarum diversificantium11 14b38, 42;
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b)

(second) matter, matter united with form:

11

dicimus esse

plures materias quam unam" 14b43.
Note.
~

The term is only used in an example, and is not treated

professo in this work.

t<!ATERIALIS, -E
'

Material, physical.

dispositiones materiales, quae sunt causae corruptionis 11 14b48.

1

:riiATERIALITl'l..It

Materially.

In a logical sense, as opposed to formally,
in subject-matter only:

"non perfecte exprimit rationem

veritatis, sed quasi materiali ter tantum" 23bl6.
MAXIME

In the fullest sense, most completely.
11

maxime entia ••• maxima vera 11 4al5, 17, 20, 21.

MEDIUS, (-A), -UM

subst.

Intermediary, go-between.

"actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum"
2lb51, "non est possibile ut organum medium cadat inter potentiam
sensitivam et seipsum" 22al0, "sensus inveniatur quodammodo mediu
inter intellectum et res" 25a31.
Note.

The use of both masculine and neuter genders as sub-

stantives is confirmed in classical Latin usage.
M8NS, MEUTIS

a)

?.:ind.

Opposed to "in rebus 11 (5bl9),

r
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"verum et falsurn in mente 11 5a39, 5b20 (a

mind, thought:

translation of .Aristotle's

lv ("'tft]<t>\.u...,o(cx.,

Metaphys. VI,

4, 1027b27 -- "thought" in the Oxford translation by W. !).
Ross, ibid.);
b)

equivalent to
i)
ii)

11

intellectus",

"mente nostra" 10b3, "mens decipitur" 24a48;
of God's intellect, always in context of exemplary
causality --

MENSUP..A, -AE

a)

11

in mente divina 11 14a4, 17b40, 43, 10b3.

Measure.

Norm, standard, pattern:

equivalent to "ars" -- "veritas •••

in rebus secundum quod imitantur intellectum divinum, qui
est earum mansura sicut ars est mansura omnium artificiatorum" 20a29, 9bll, 13, 23a7, usually with nextrinseca" -11veritas ••• qua denominantur omnia vera sicut extrinseca
mansura" 12b53, 13a50, 17b28, "mansura extrinseca, sicut
locatum loco" 12bl7, 9bl8, 20;
b)

(internal) dimension, form
'1

(cr.

FOIDv~,

1), measurement:

sicut mansura intrinseca ••• et has etiam mensuras oportet

plurificari secundum pluralitatem mensuratorum, sicut diverserum corporum sunt dimensiones diversae 11 9b23, 25, 17all,
"mensuratur autem corpus mansura intrinseca, sicut linea,
vel superficie, vel profunditate'' 12bl5.

r
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MENS1JRATIO, -IONIS

!leasure, norm.

Equivalent to "mansura extrinseca" ( Cf •.MENSURA, a) --

11

intel-

lectus enim practicus causat res, unde est mensuratio rerum quae
per ipsum fiunt, ••• sicut omnia artificiata in intellectu
artificis" 5b27.
lVIE!IJSURO, -ARE

1.

To measure.

To act as the norm for, to determine by way of exemplary
causality (not "to ascertain measurement of", as in English):
of the Divine intellect toward things -- "res ••• sunt
mensuratae ab intellectu divino" 5b35, 39, 40, 41, 8bll,
23a7, 18bl7, 34;
of created things toward created intellect as knowing them
"sed intellectus speculativus ••• res mensurant ipsum" 5b31,
34, 41, 12b24, 20a33, but of created intellect toward thin&s
it can make -- "intellectus practicus ••• mensurans" 5b42.

2.

Loosely -- "(Dei) cogni tio ••• aete.rni tate mensuretur" 13a34.

MODUS, -I
a)

Way, manner.
Used frequently, with no philosophical implications, to
express the way or manner something is done or exists;
except,

b)

the vmy something is conceived,
aspect, meaning:

"aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens in

,quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine antis non
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exprimitur 11 2b35, 37 (second occurrence), 38, 48, 50, 3al3
(first occurrence), 4a4.

-us

MOTUS,

a)

Motion, activity.
In an intransitive sense,
local motion:

"per motum localem 11 l6a46;

activity, motion:
virtutis 11 5b2,

11

11

cujuslibet motus 11 5bl,

motus cognitivae

motus appetitivae virtutis 11 5b5;

whole sequence of connected activities:
11 circulum

11

equivalent to

quemdam in actibus animae 11 (5b9 -- "res intellecta

movet appetitum, et appetitus tunc ducit ad hoc quod perveniat ad rem a qua motus incepit 11 5bl4;
b)

in a transitive sense,
activation, causation of movement:

11

lux quae causatur in

aere ab extrinseco, scilicet ex sole, sequitur motum solis
magis quam aerem" 6a37.
MOVEO

,

To move, to set in motion.

.-'ERE
11

res quae est extra animam movet intellectum, et res intellecta

movet appetitum 11 5bl0, 12, 23b53, "sicut locus non dicitur moveri
quando aliquid secundum locum movetur" l6b42, 43;
perf. part.

11

intellectus speculativus ••• est quodammodo motus a

rebus'' 5b30.
Note.

This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike

the English "move" which is ambiguous.

The passive is usually
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indicated by the use of the preposition

11

a., a.b", otherwise the

passive ha.s the force of a. middle voice.
.MULTUS, -A, -IDA
11

Much, pl. many •

hujusmodi verita.tes resulta.ntes in a.nimabus nostris a. prima

veritate sunt multae" 10b7.
Note.

The word here simply signifies numerical multiplicity, not

variety of kinds or analogy.

Cf. PLUS.

The macrocosm, the universe at large.

MUNDUS Y.AJOR

The universe, including the heavenly bodies as well as the earth
and its elements:

"in majori mundo superiora nihil a.ccipiunt a.b

inferioribus, sed e converso" 26al2.
MUTABILIS, -E
a)

Changeable.

Being the subject of change:

"subjectum muta.tionis, sicut

dicimus corpus esse muta.bile"· 16bl7, 18, 22;
b)

being the formality which changes:

"secundum ipsum fit

muta.tio ••• et sic quaeritur de veritate, an sit mutabilis"
16b27;
i)

by extrinsic denomination -- "locus est immuta.bilis
terminus continentia" 16b45;

ii)

by change of internal determination,
a')

within a. generic form,

11

secund'¥Ii esse sed non

secundum rationem11 (17a3) -- "verita.s rei
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secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum •••
mutatur veritas rei mutabilis in aliam veritatem, non in falsitatem" 17a35;
b1)

by change of specific form,

11

forrna enim

specialis post mutationem non remanet eadem
nee secundum esse nee secundum rationem"
{16b54-56) -- 18a3, 4.
See also MUTATIO, MUTO.
Change.

!viUTATIO, -IONIS
Note.

If translated "change", this word must be understood in

a passive or intransitive meaning.
a)

In a general sense -- 16bl6, 24, 29, "facta omni mutatione 11
18al2;

b)

specifically,

i)

extrinsic change;

l6b40;

ii)

intrinsic change:

16b37, 51, 52;

a1)

change within a generic form:

11

sicut facta

mutatione de albo in nigrum, manet idem color
secundum co1mnunem rationem coloris, sed non
eadem coloris species" 17a4, "forma generalis
facta mutatione remanet eadem secundum
rationem, sed non secundum esse" 17a2, 39, 44;
b1)

change of specific form:

11

sicut albedo,
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facta alteratione, nullo modo ma.net"
{16b57-17al) -- "forma enim specialis post
mutationem non remanet eadem nee secundum
esse nee secundum rationem 11 16b55, 17bl4, 55,
18a6, 10.
See also 1'..1UTABILIS, M1JTO.
1iUTO, -ARE
a)

To change.
11

In general

aliquid dicitur mutari dupliciter; uno modo •••

16bl5, 23, 25, 17b24;
b)

specifically,
i)
ii)

to change only by extrinsic denomination:
to change intrinsically:

16b39;

16b30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41,

50, "unde res creatae variantur quidem in participa-

tione veritatis primae; ipsa autem veritas prima,
secundum quam dicuntur vera, nullo modo mutatur"
17al5;
a')

To change within a generic form:

(cf.

MUTABILIS, b, ii, a', and MlJTATIO, b, ii, a')
-- 16b53,

11

si autem accipimus veritatem in-

haerentem rebus, sic veritas mutari dicitur
secundum quod aliqua secundum veritatem
mutantur 11 17a22, 24, "mutatur veritas rei
mutabilis in aliam veritatem, non in falsitatem" 17a35;
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b1)

to change as regards a specific form:

(cr.

MUTABILIS, b, ii, b', and wmTATIO, b, ii, b')
-- 17a57, 17bll, 12, 13, 20, 53.
See also MUTABILIS, 1ruTATIO.
Nota.

This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike

the English "changen which is ambiguous.
indicated by use of the preposition
has the force of a middle voice.

11

The passive is usually

a, ab 11 , otherwise the passiVE

r
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Nature.

NATURA, -.AE

1.

In the logical order,
nature as conceived:

"anti non potest addi aliquid quasi

extranea natura" 2b27, 4a.3.•
2.

In the ontological order,
a)

in general,
nature, essential constitution:

equivalent to "quod

quid est~ (2Sa37) -- 23a40, 15a51, 17b4l, 42;
equivalent to "essentia 11
with implication

o~

--

2b29, 44;

internal source

o~

activity,

14a49, 52;
i)
ii)

opposed to "accidentia" -- 23a47;
said o~ accidents -- "ex natura virtutis est"
14a53, "natura ipsius actus 8 2lb25, 40,
"natura ••• intellectus" 2lb26, 28, 39;

b)

reality, extra-mental existence:

"relatio naturae"

15a50;
order

o~

things:

"Deus natura sit prior omnibus

creaturis" 15a48, 54;
i)

with "rerum",
the world of reality, nature, the universe:
"in rerum natura" 9b39, opposed to "in ratione

tantum" (15a5, 25, 31) -- 14b54, l5al, 4, 11,
24, 30, 39 , 56;
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ii)

with "propria",
in itself, existing in its own nature:

"res

non fuerint ab aeterno in propria natura"
14a27, 28,
NATURALIS, -E

1.

:n.

Natural.

Physical, corporeal:

"res naturales" 14a46, 5b32, 40, 42;

having its own intrinsic nature 5b43;
contrasted with what is free or voluntary 14a46;
contrasted to what is in the realm of consciousness
11

2.

potentiae naturales insensibiles" 22al2.

Proper to a nature, flowing from the very nature of a thing:
"naturalis autam actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo,
nisi per accidens" 25b43, contrasted with "per quamdam col•
lationem" (25b37) -- "sensus autam judicium de quibusdam est
naturale" 25b35, "existimatio naturalis" 25b40.

NATUS, -A, -UM

Note.

Apt by nature.

Only the perfect participle of the verb "nascor" appears

in the work, and not in the literal sense of "born", but
denoting that which is so constituted that by its very nature
it 'has a tendency or aptitude for a certain action or object.
Apt by nature, able naturally, tending naturally:

"res ••• natae

sunt faoere de sa veram apprehensionem in intelleotu humano"
20a3l, 3a25, 4a24, 4bl, 5b56, Sal, 7a28, l3b4, 20a31, 37, "illa

r
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~

quae

sunt contrariam dispositionam induoere" 14b34.
Necessarily.

NECESSARIO

"neo res ••• neoessario falsitatam causat" 23a50, 25b9.
Negation.

NEGATIO, -IONIS
1.

(Verbal) negation, denial, negative propositions
et

2.

affi~atio"

"negatio

24al0, 3a8.

In the ontological order,
lack, non-entity:

"negationes vel privationes existentes

extra animam" 20a44, 13a54, "negationes et defectus" 2la20,
23al2.
NEGOTI OR, •A.RI

To engage in.

"intellectus ••• negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b2.
Note.

The word literally means "to do business", used

metaphorically of engaging in any activity.
NOMEN 1

-

INIS

Note.

Word,

na.Jre ,

te~.

The word is frequently used, but always in the sense of

simply a "word" in the grammatical sense.
NON ENS
a)

Non-being.
Opposed to ENS, a (q.v.),
that to which non-existence is proper, that which has not
existence:

"omnis defectus est non ens" 24al8, "non ens est

r
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t

apprehensum ab intellectu" 4&37, 38;
b)

opposed to ENS, b (q.v., and see also FRIVAXIO), privation
in the real order:

"non ens extra

an~

existans" 13b8, 13,

15, 22, 55, 14a7, 8, 2la30.
Non-existence.

NON ESSE
Opposed to ESSE, 2,

non-existence, the non-being indicated by a negative

propositio~

"non esse rei" l3bl8, "non esse extra animam existens" 2la27, 31.
NOTUS, -A, •UM

perf. part. of nosco.

"principia per se

~"

Knovm, understood.

2bl5, "quae statim nota sunt intel-

lectui" 26b9, "notis rerum quidditatibus" 26bl0.
Note.

The word is used in this work to refer to intellectual

knowledge exclusively.
NOTITIA, -AE

Acquaintance, knowledge.

"res ••• ingerant sui notitiam in intellectu nostro" 20a48, 23a31,
24bl6.
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Preliminary dialectical argument, objection.

OBJECTIO, •IONIS

"objeotio autem procedebat de causa efficiente" 2la34.
OBJICIO,

See

l~ote.

To put forth, to throw in front of.

OBJICIO, -ERE

"quae contra objiciuntur" 4a50, 24a32, "ex hoc patet solutio ad
objecta" 22al6, 26b48.
Note.

It is clear from an analysis of the method of St. Thomas

that OBJECTIO,

11

objecta", "objiciuntur", etc., are not to be

taken as equivalent to the more recent scholastic "objection",
as to a thesis laid down.
Aristotle's typical procedure in approaching a problem was
to begin eaoh book or chapter with a review of the opinions of
those who had previously discussed the question, less with a
view to the setting down of historical fact than with a desire to
put himself in

c~ntact

with the experience of earlier thinkers,

and to set the problem in its clearest light before beginning his
own analysis and solution.

To call this the dialectical phase

of his treatment is not to imply any of the display of skill in
logic, still less any of the sophistry, sometimes connoted by
the moder.n use of the term dialectical, nor to put it in the
class of a mere schoolboy exercise upon a matter already settled,
but rather to state the first step in his philosophical method.

r
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st. Thomas imitated Aristotle in this point more closely
than the difference of the printed page would lead one to suspect
His word "objicio" • like the Greek1'l'~o~ti..A.'A.<U (whence"Jt,~~A'1\fJ-O. •
"problem"), means not to "object" against a settled thesis, but
to offer for consideration. to throw up as a possible view.

His

own position, and the demonstration of the same, begins with the

words, "Respondeo dicendum".

That the arguments offered in the

"Sed contra" are still in the dialectical phase of his procedure is clear for many reasons.

First, by analogy with

Aristotle, as discussed above, he is putting forth various possible solutions.

Secondly, these arguments are almost entirely

a matter of quoting authorities, and very often of Holy Scripture; yet it is known what place these held for St. Thomas in a
strictly philosophical demonstration.

Thirdly, the "Sed contra"

often represents a view as divergent from his own as that in the
first series of

ar~~ents,

so that his

~n

position is a mean

between these extremes; in this case he usually provides answers
of "solutiones" to both series (e.g., art. IV of this work).
li'ourthly, that he does not offer the "Sed contra" as his own
view appears from cases where he answers it even though it is a
single argument (e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 8, 3), or
where he eli sagrees with it explicitly

in

the body of the article

(e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 78, 4), or finally, where he comes
closer to agreeing with the first series ("objections"?) in his
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reply {e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 17, 2).
Cf. F. A. Blanche, "Le vocabulaire de !'argumentation et la
structure de !'article dans las ouvrages de saint Thomas", Revue
~sciences

asp. 180-182.

philosophiquas!! theologiquas, 1925, XIV, 167-187,
Also Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichta

~

Scho1astischen Methode, Herder, Freiburg, 1909, 2 vols., esp. II,
519; IvT..ichel Riquet, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et les 'auctoritates.'
en phi1osophio",
OBJECTUM, -1

Archives~

Philosophie, 1925, III, 2:

117-155.

Object.

That which is presented for knowledge, hence, knowable and known:
"quidditas rei est objectum intellectus" 26bl5, "sensus ••• objeotum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34.
OPERATIC, -IONIS

Operation, function.

"operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id propter quod ad finem
devenitur" 24bl0, 20b21, 22, "intel1eotus ••• secundum quod ad
omnes operationes sa extendit" 26b42, 26, 7a38, 21bl6.
ORATIO, -IONIS

Speech, words, assertion.

"homo, qui est electivus orationum suarum" 7a30;
equivalent to "enuntiatio" -- 6a41, 13a42, 43, 44, 48.
ORDINATIO, -IONIS

Ordering, plan.

"verum est secundum ordinationam veram in inte1lectu divino"
15b3, "sicut ••• ordinationan artis in artifice" 15b6.
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Order, relation.

ORDO, •INIS
1.

Order:
a)

arrangement, sequence:

"hoc ordine progreditur"

25a28,
b)

place in an order or scheme of things:
~

"idem est

alicujus rei in esse et veritate, ita scilicet

quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, invenitur
quod est maxima verum" 4al8, 13.
2.

Relation:

equivalent to "convenientia" -- "bonum••• dicit

ordinem ad appetitum" 5bl5;
equivalent to "comparatio", "relatio" -- "veritas rei
secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum" 17a34, 49, 3al4,
7al9, 20, 25b23, 30;
in the phrase "in ordine ad" {does not denote purpose) -2b54, 6a9, 9a38, 39, 23bl0, 40, 25a36, 41.
Organ, sense-organ.

ORGANUM, -I

"sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9, 10,
23b49, 26a4.
Note.

st. Thomas is not at all explicit as to the specific

organs of sensation in this work.

To define the mind of St.

Thomas (and Aristotle) accurately on the localization of sense
organs is a very difficult problem.
"Notes d'ex~g~se thamiste:

cr.

Joseph de

Tonqu~ec,

Milieux et organes de la sensation",

Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, 2:

156-167.
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Part.

PARS, PARTIS
1.

Opinion, side of a dialectical discussion:

"ideo oportet

rationibus utriusque partis respondere".
2.

Logical component, note:

"conjungit partes definitionis ad

invicem" 26b26.
3.

A whole considered precisely as source of a certain class of
activities:

"vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae

partis" (sc. animae) 25b39.

RES, c.

see

(EX) PARTE RERUM

I'

To

PATIOR, -I
Opposed to AGO

~e

acted upon.

"intellectus ••• non patitur a rebus, sed magis

quodammodo agit" 23a53, 18al9.
PARTIC1~IS,

Particular, individual.

-E

Equivalent to "individuo" (14bl7, 20) -- 14bl2.
Accidentally, incidentally.

PER ACCIDENS
1.

Accidentally, through mishap, unintentionally:

"nisi per

accidens impediatur" 25b44, 26bl9.
2.

a)

Incidentally, by reason of something else:
••• non

"species

corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens ad oor-

ruptionem individui" 14bl9, 26, 30, 35;
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b)

indirectly, by means of something else:
sensibilibus

~

"sensus ••• de

accidens" 25b42, 51.

Consequently.

PER CONSEQl.J'lliS

By logical necessity, as a consequence, consequently:

2lb40,

24a55.
PER ESSENTIAM
a)

Essentially, in essence.

Opposed to "differunt ratione" (4a28),
in essence, really:

b)

"per essentiam differunt" 4a32, l5b36;

opposed to "per suam speciem" (5a52),
real (physical) essence:

in

"res non sunt in anima per sua.m

essentiam, sed per suam speciem" 4b51;
c)

opposed to "diversas cognitiones" (13a26),
through (Eis own) Essence:

"[Deus] omnia per unum, scilicet

per essentiam suam cognoscit" 13a29.
Secondarily, less properly.

PER POSTERIUS

Explicitly equivalent to "secundario",
secondarily, in an analogous sense:
verum et
PER PRIUS
a)

~

"seoundario autem dicitur

posteriua" 7a6, 5a45, 55, 5b22, 6al6.
Primarily, properly.

Contrasted with PER POSTERIUS,
in

a primary sense, properly, more properly:

"per prius et

posterius" 5b22, "verum per prius dicitur de oampositione
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vel divisione intelleotus" 7a22, 4, 5a47, 50, 56, 5b23, 6a5,
15, 6b30, 31;
b)

primarily:

"per prius etiam inest rei veritas per compara-

tionem ad intellectum divinum" 9a30.
PER SE

Of itself.

·a)

Of itself, on its o1r.1n account, in itself:
corrumpitur par

~·

11

universale ••• non

sed per accidens ad corruptionem in•

dividui" 14bl9, "nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam
specialis modus essendi, scilicet
b)

properly, by reason of its nature:

~!!

ens" 2b47;

"a sensu ••• cujus per!!

objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34, 14b22, 38, 23b4.
PERCIPIO, •ERE

To perceive.

To know by sense knowledge:
PERFECTIO, -IONIS

"sensu percipitur" l0a2.

Perfection, actuality.

"duplex est perfectio" 24b6,
a)

substantial form:

"prin~

perfectio est forma unius-

oujusque, per quam habet esse" 24b7, 13:
b)

operation:

PERFECTISSIMUS, -A, -UM

"secunda perfectio est operatio" 24bl0, 12.
Most perfect.

On the highest level of perfection (of species, not of most

perfect individuals within species):

"quae sunt £erfectissima

in entibus, ut substantiae intelleotuales" 2lb43.
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PERFECTUS, -A, -UM
a)

Perfect.

Complete, in the .full measure:

Equi\18.lent to "completa"

(5a49) -- "perfecta ratio veritatis" 5a52, 55, 23bl5;
b)

perfect, adequate:

"bonum uniuscujusque rei consistit in

perfecta operatione ipsius" 20b20, 21, 24b26.
PERFICIO, -ERE

To perfect.

To bring to perfection, to completea

11

cognitio nostra •• •.£!!.:.

ficitur in intelleotu" 25a29, "cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem oognitam" 3a35, 45, 3b6.
PERPETUUS, •A, -UM

Perpetual, constant.

Constant, unvarying once it is established:

contrasted with

"aeternum" -- 14a5, 46, 47, 14b8.
PERSONA, -.A.E
1.

Person.

One of the three Divine Persons of the Blessed Trinity (with
no attempt at formal treatment or further definition) -4bl8, 19, 21, 24, 18b4l.

2.

stage character, person of a play:

"tragoedus qui represen-

tat varas personas in theatris" 24a4.
PERSONALITER

Personally.

Appropriately to one of the Divine Persons:

opposed to "essen-

tialiter" 18a27, "metaphorica vel similitudinarie accipitur
veritas in divinis ••• et secundum hanc acceptionam veritatis
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propria dicitur de Filio, et personaliter dicitur" 18b54.
PERTINGO. -ERE

To attain.

To attain, to arrive at (not t•pertain to"):

"solus intellectus

ad assentiam. rei pertingit" 26a56.
PHANTASIA. -AE

Power of phantasy, imagination.

Equivalent to "inaginatio" (26a2), contrasted with external
sense -- "sensus non est dominus falsitatis, sed phantasia"
26al0.
PHILOSOPHUS. -I
Aristotle:

The Philosopher.
this is the usual manner of referring to him, fre-

quent throughout the work.
PLUS, PLURIS

Mora, pl. several.

"Veritatas autam quae sunt in rebus sunt pluras" 9al9, 53.
Note.

The plurality hare indicated is numerical, not of kind.

Logical truth, truth in the mind, is analogous. but ontological
truth, the truth of things, is one for each thing. multiplied
only by plurality of things

"plurium verorum sunt plures

veritates; sed unius rei una est tantum varitas" 9a53-54.
PONO, -ERE

To assert, to affirm.

Literally, to place. to set down.
this work,

Metaphorically, as always in.
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to assert, to affirm:

except in "cognoscunt aliquid extra se

positum" 2lb47, where the participle means "existing", "located".
POSITIO, -IONIS
Cf. PONO.

Affirmation, attribution.
"unitas per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per

positionem alicujus formae unitatis, sed per ranotionem formarum
diversificantium" 14b39.
POSITIVE

Positively, affirmatively.

"ea quae in rebus positive dicuntur" 23a8, contrasted with
"negationes et defeotus" (23al2-13).
Potency, power.

POTENTIA, -AE
1.

Opposed to actuality,
potency, possibility:

"nulla est res quam intelleotus

divinus non actu cognoscit, et intellectus humanus in
potentia" 6a50, 56.
2.

Opposed to operation,
power, ability, proximate principle of activity:

equivalent

to VIRTUS, 2, and VIS -- "potentiae naturales insensibiles"
22al2,

11

vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis"

25b38, "potentia sensitiva" 22all, 4b33, 10a39.
Note.

In view of the fact that st. Thomas uses this word

almost exclusively when speaking of the powers of the soul,
it seems quite unjustifiable when translating St. Thomas to
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risk the unpleasant connotations which have accrued to the
word "faculty" in the psychology of the recant past.
Previous considerations.

-ORUM

PRAI.'..~ISSA,

"ut ex praemissis apparat" 16al.
Nota.

Derived f'rom "prae" and "mi tto", the word literally means

"to send bef'ore".

It here ref'ars, like "objecta" (22al6, 26b48),

to the preliminary dialectical arguments proposed before the body
of the article.

Cf'. OBJICIO, Note.
Chief'ly, in a more important sense.

PRINCIPALIUS

"res aliqua principalius dicitur vera in ordine ad veritatem
intellectus divini" 9a37.
Principle, beginning.

PRINCIPIUM, -I
1.

Start, beginning:
a)

f'irst moment (in time):

"veritas clauditur principio

et f'ine" 13a41, 42, 48;
b)

f'irst part (in place):

"in principio Digestorum

dicitur" 14a56, 2b23, 3a5, 4a43.
2.

Logical principle, principle of demonstration, basic truth:
"in damonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua
principia per sa nota" 2bl5, "prima principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus" 26bll, 13, 36, 46,
"veri tas primorum principiorum secundum quam de omnibus
judicamus" 9b51.
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3.

Ontological principle, origin:
a)

proximate principle of action, active power:

"prin-

cipii aotivi, quod est ipse intellectus" 2lb26;
b)

origin:
i)

real cause:

"ratio principii ad creaturas ad

quas intelleotus divinus comparatur ut •••
causa" 18b32, 18, 20, 26, 35, 36, 37, 48, 6a34;
ii)

denoting origin or procession in the Blessed
Trinity without dependence, causality, or succession in time -- "hoo modo dioitur veritas in
divinis summa imitatio principii, quae Filio
oonvenit" 18b51.

PRIV.A.TIO, -IONIS

Privation.

Laok of something proper to a nature:

"privationem quae est

oaeoitas" 20b3, "negationes vel privationes non habent aliquam
formam" 20a44, "privatio et negatio rei" 13a54, 20bl4, 23al7.
PROCEDO, -ERE

To proceed, flow logically.

"objectio autam prooedebat de ••• " 2la34, 23b39.
PROPINQUIOR, •IUS

Nearer.

Relative degree of perfection (not physical proximity):
••• qui est propinquior intellectuali substantiae" 22al.

"sensus
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PROPORTIO, -IONIS
Note.

Proportion, symmetry.

Like ADAEQUATIO, to which it is equivalent in this work,

the word is not to be taken in a strict mathematical sense but as
denoting a correspondence between the representative and the real
order.

"proportio intellectus ad ram" 2lb23, 41.

PROPOSITIO, -IONIS
1.

Proposition.

Equivalent to ENUNTIATIO, 1, -- "affirmatio propositionis"
23bl8, 4a45;

2.

equivalent to JUDICIUM, 1, -- "causa veritatis negativarum
propositionum quasi faciens eas in intellectu" 2la28,
"intellectus compositi ... propositionis" 3b33.
Proposed (argument).

PROPOSITUM, -I

"Et sic est in proposito" 14b44. Refers to dialectical argument
to which reply is being made.
PROPRIETAS, -ATIS

Ct. OBJICIO, Note.

Property, predicate.

Loosely, referring to any quality or attribute which can serve
as a basis for predication

"proprietas quam praedieat hoc

nomen 'homo'" 15b34, 13.
PROPRIUS, -A, -UM
1.

Proper, own.

Proper, suitable:
a)

proper or suitable to being known by a given external
sense power:

"de propriis sensibilibus" 25b35, 48;
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b)

suited to knowing a certain type of object or sensible
quality:

2.

"sensus proprius" 26al.

Equivalent to "suus",
one's own:

11

cognoscunt essentias proprias" 2lb53, 6b40, 50,

7a40, 26bl5.
PURUS I

Genuine, umnixed.

-A., -UM

Merely, simply (unmixed with any other reality, i.e., real horse
in this case):
~

"equus pictus non asset falsus equus, nisi asset

pictura" 24a8.
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QUALIS, -E

Such, of such a kind.

Broadly, not restricted to the category of quality -- "dicuntur
falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non
sunt" 6a2, 23a44, 25b52.
QUALITAS, -ATIS
11

Quality.

in genera qualitatis" 4al2, "a forma inhaerente, sicut ••• a

qualitate sua" 9b7, "illam

fo~

cujus indicia exterius

ostenduntur per sensibiles qualitates" 23b45, 23a39, "sensus •••
cujus per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34.
Note.

No attempt is made to define the word or discuss the

category in this work.
QU.ANTITAS, •ATIS

Quantity.

"est inhaerens ei ... sicut albedo vel quantitas" 16b34, 17a56,
"genera, in quantum hujusmodi, aliquid ponant in rerum natura,
quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod quantitas est, aliquid dicit"
14b55, 56.
QUIDDITAS, -ATIS
1. What a thing is:

Quiddity.
explicitly equivalent to "essentia 11

--

quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a7;
the proper object of intellection --

11

quidditas rei est

propria objectum intelleotus" 26bl4, 8, 10.
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2.

The mental representation of quiddity, concept:

11

intellectus

formans quidditates non habet nisi similitudinam rei existentis extra animam11 6b43, 25b23, the result of the first
operation of the intellect --

11

formatio <i,Uidditatis sit

prima operatio intelleotus" 7a38, 6bl0, 34.
Note.

That knowledge of quiddity does not mean adequate and

specific knowledge of an essence precisely as "infima species"
is clear from a study of St. Thomas's description of the actual
process of human knowledge, in spite of the rather ideal impression he sometimes gives when speaking of knowledge in general
Rather, as Gilson remarks on P• 222 of the work noted below, "the
quiddity is the essence insofar as it is knowable and definable
by us", at least in its generic but essential notes.

The

laborious process in store for him who would work out specific
differences is referred to in article 12 of the work being
studied, and in Summa Theologica, Ia, 85, 5 ad 3um; 17, 3 corp.;
87, 1

~

finem corp••

etc.

Compare also the texts in which he

states that "differentiae essentia1es sunt nobis ignotae"
Veritate IV, 1 ad 8um);
3um; .&, Disp.

£!

~ Critique~

derni~re

~

(B!

Disp. De Spirit. Creat., q. un., 11 ad

Anima, q. un., 12 ad 8um.

Cf. J. de Tonqu&dec,

la Connaissanoe, Note "Sur 1' expression de la

diff&rence

sp~cifique",

542-543; Etienne Gilson,

Realisme Thomiste !,! Critique 2!_ ~ Connaissanoe, 222 and notes
ibid.; Cajetan.,

~ ~ ~ ~

Essentia, cap. vi, quaest. xv ad
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initium; Pierre Rousselot,

~ Intellectualism~

St. Thomas,

Sheed & Ward, London, 1935, 101-110.
QUOD EST

That which is, essence.

Explicitly equivalent to "id oui actus essendi convenit" (4b7)
-- "diversum est esse et quod.!!!, 4b6.
QUOD QUID EST

What a thing is, quiddity.

Equivalent to "quidditas" (26bl4) -- "intellectus in cognosoendo
quod quid est" 23a37.
Connaissance, Note

r··--·~

-·

(Cf. de Tonqu,dec, ~Critique de la

f"r
I"';'
"\b"'t.I.V\"

"r
tl.'lf4L

", 531-532.)
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R

Note, character, reason, argument.

RATIO, -IONIS.

1.

Most frequently, and throughout the work except as noted
below, nn. 2, 3, 4,
note, character:

e.g.,

any for.m or perfection which can serve as a basis of predication or conception:

"ratio veri in rebus" 24bl4, l5bll,

27, 28, 30, "secundum rationem quae invanitur in creaturis"
l8b45;
nature, essence:

"ratio veritatis compleatur in intellectu"

14a34, "ens, verum, unum, et bonum secundum rationem habent
quod unum

sm1t, unde ••• realiter unum sunttt 4b32, 37;

including real privations -- "negationes vel privationes
existentes extra animam ••• intallectus earum rationes apprehendit" 20a49.
2.

a)

Idea or concept:

"intellectus rationem antis acoipit

in seipso" l3bl4, "anima deprehendit in sa rationem
defeotus" 2la45, 46, "nomine veritatis non axprimitur
ratio oonceptionis" 19al9, 3a44, 3b26, 17a6, 17b34, ... '
l8b20, 32, 35, 37, l9a3, 23bl5, 24a26;
b)

(operation of) the mini:

"secundum rationem" 16b56,

17a3, "differunt ·ratione" 3b44, "distinctio rationis"
19a9, 4a22, 26, 28, 4b20, 29;
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c)

meaning, comprehension of a term:

"veritas de lapide

dicta claudit in sui ratione entitatem lapidis, et
superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum" 20a55, 41,
20b36, 55.
3.

a)

Reasoning, consideration; argument:

"oportet rationi-

bus utriusque partis respondere 11 23bl2, "ratio illa
concedenda est" 23b38, 4bl0, 16, 13b31, 54;
b)

reason, explanation:

11

cujus est ratio, quia ••• "

2lb42, 22a7;
c)

~'

because of, by reason of:

ratione ramotionis 11 14b32,

11

"attribuitur per se

dicitur vera vel falsa

ratione compositionis verae vel falsae" 7a8.
4.

Power of reason:

equivalent to "rationalis" -- "virtus est

habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a52.
Note.

In 6al2 it can be translated 11the very fact", "the whole

matter", "the reality" --

"eti~

si intellectus humanus non

esset, adhuo, res dioerentur verae in ordine ad intelleotum
divinum.

Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossibile, in-

telligeretur auferri, nullo modo veritatis ratio remaneret"
6a7-13.

The sentence suggests that Aristotle, whose God did not

know the world, had no real guarantee of ontological truth.
RATIOCINATIO, -IONIS
11

Reasoning, discursive thinking.

alio modo potast accipi intelleotus communiter, secundum quod
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ad omnes operationes se extendit. at sic camprehendit opinione.m
at ratiocinationem" 26b44.
To reason, to think discursively.

RAXIOCINOR. •ARI

"ulterius intellectus ••• negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo"
26b2.
Rational, capable of reasoning.

RATIONALIS, -E

"intellectus falso ••• animal rationale mortale conciperet" 26b24.
Note.

The distinction between rational and other intellectual

beings is nowhere brought out in this work.
REALIS, ·E

Real.

Opposed to "rationis" (of. 2, b, s.v.) -- "realis distinotio
intelligitur" l9a6, nnon intelligitur realis distinctio, sed
rationis tantum" 19a9.
Correctness.

RECTITUDO, •INIS
1.

Correctness of representation, conformity:
rectitudo sola mente peroeptibilis.

"veritas est

Rectitudo enim ista

secundum adaequationem quamdam dioitur" 3b9-10.
2.

Moral rectitude:
nicationis

"Deus permittat deformitatem actus for-

incidere; non taman sequitur ex hoc quod ipsa

deformitas aliquam rectitudinem habeat" 2lal7.
Nota •
.........

The reading "aliquam" for "aliam" conjectured by the

editors of the 1784 Venice edition and the Parma edition is

r
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confirmed by the four Paris codices upon which the Viv~s
edition is based, and is adopted by the latter.
RECTUS, •A, •UM
1.

Right, correct.

Logically correct:

"recte fiat resolutio in prima prin-

cipia" 26b45.
2.

:Morally right:

REDEO, •IRE

"bonum, debitum, rectum et hujusmodi 11 2la2.
To return, to reflect.

Literally, to go back, to return.

Metaphorically ("quodammodo"

26b47), not of a physical but of a mental return,
to reflect:

equivalent to "reflectitur" (2lb30) -- "secundum

vero quod cognoscunt se oognoscere, jam ad se redire incipiunt"
2lb49, "substantiae intellectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam
reditione com.pleta" 2lb44, 56, 22a2, 13.
REDITIO, -IONIS

Return, reflection.

Like REDEO, of mental returning,
reflection:

equivalent to REDITUS -- "substantiae intellectuales

redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa" 2lb45, 56, 22a5.
REDITUS, -US

Return, reflection.

Like REDEO, and equivalent to REDITIO,
reflection:

"reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt

essentias proprias" 2lb52.
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To reduce.

REDUCO, -ERE

To give meaning in terms of, to reduce to:

"veritas secundum

quod competit negationibus at defectibus reducitur ad veritatem
simpliciter" 2la21.
REDUCTIO, -IONIS

Reduction.

Tracing back, reduction;

equivalent to RESOLUTIO --

11

in

demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia
per sa nota" 2bl5.
To relate.

REFERO, -RE
a)

Of things,
to relate, i.e., to establish a relation:

"veritas super-

addit habitudinam ad intellectum ••• cum habeat aliquid
secundum quod referri possit" 20b2, 15a9, 17, 18;
b)

of predication,
to have reference to:

"affirmatio at negatio ••• non

referuntur ad idem" 24all, 15bl9, 2la5, 12.
REFLECTO, -ERE
Note.

To reflect.

The verb in this work always appears in the passive, with

the force of a middle voice.
"inflectitur" (17b30).

Equivalent to "redeunt" (2lb44),

The word means literally "to bend back";

the metaphorical turn is brought out clearly by St. Thomas's
uses.
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"intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum
quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad ran" 2lb20, 31, 13b46.
Relation.

RELATIO, -IONIS
1.

That predicament which asserts a relation of one thing
toward another:

"cum omnia alia genera ••• sola relatio non

habet, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi, quod aliquid ponat in
rerum natura, quia non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid"
l4b56.
2.

The relation so indicated;

equivalent to COMPARATIO (q.v.),

used frequently throughout the work, e.g., "veritas ••• in
rebus aliis invenitur per relationem ad intelleotum" 9al.
RELATIVUS, -A, -UM

subst.

Related thing, term of a relation.

"quando unum relativorum pendet ex altero" l5a26.
~fOTIO,

-IONIS

?rescinding.

The result of mentally neglecting, prescinding from (not denying)
11

Quandoque attribuitur per sa ratione remotionis ••• sicut unitas

per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus
formae unitatis, sed per remotionem for.marum diversificantium"
l4b32, 40.
REPRESENTATIVUS, -A, -UM Representative.
Standing for, representative:

opposed to "est res quaedam in se"

144
(25a49), equivalent to "indicativus" (ibid.) -- "sensus •••
secundum quod est representativus alterius rei" 25b3.
RES. REI
a)

Thing.
In general, and throughout the work,
thing:

"sic imponitur hoc nomen

!!!•

quod in hoc differt ab

ente ••• quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed

nomen~

exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a4-7;
b)

with NA.TURALIS (q.v.),
body:

c)

"res naturales" 5b32, 40, 42, 43, l4a46;

with special implication of actual existence,
reality:

"ex parte rerum" l0a50, "in rerum natura" 9b39,

l4b54, l5al, 4, 11, 24, 30, 39, 56 (cf. NATURA, 2, b, i),
"differunt re" 4b20, 4a54;
d)

thing as known by intellect:

"res intellecta movet appetitum

5bll.
RESOLUTIO, -IONIS

Resolving, reduction.

Equivalent to REDUCTIO -- "resolutio in prima principia" 26b45.
RESPECTUS, -"{js

Respect, reference.

"veritas ••• in rebus auten1 improprie et secundario, quia non nisi
in respectu ad alterutrum duarum veritatum" 9a9.
NOTE.

The word is weaker than "relatio" (e.g., in 9al of this

context), and implies mental consideration rather than ontological relationship.
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RESPONDEO, -ERE

To reply, to correspond.

a)

To reply, to set down definitely:

1.

so used to intro-

duce St. Thomas's own position on the question at
issue -- see OBJICIO,
b)

~~

to answer the preliminary dialectical

arg~ents:

also

indicating St. Thomas's own mind -- "et ideo oportet
rationibus utriusque partis respondere 11 23bl2.
2.

To correspond, to accord:

11

cuilibet vero intellectui oportet

quod respondeat ens aliquod" 6a29.
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s
subst.

SCIBILIS, -E

Knowable.

Knowable, object of knowledge:

"scientia dependet a scibili"

15a28, 29, 30, 53, 55.
Note.

The word is always used in this work of the object of a

creature's knowledge, actual or potential, never of God's
knowledge.
Knowledge.

SCIENTIA, -AE
a)

In general,
intellectual cognition, knowledge:

nintellectus a rebus

scientiam accipit" 9a36, 2bl9, 5b33, 15a27, 29, 31, 54, 55;
b)

implying knowledge through principles,
science:

"sicut in damonstrabilibus oportet fieri reduoti-

onem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est

~umquodque;

alias utrobique in infinitum

iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum"
2bl3-19.
Note.

The word as used in this work always refers to intel-

lectual knowledge, unlike COGNITIO, and furthermore to that
of the human intellect only.
SCIO, -IRE

To know.

Equivalent to COGNOSCO, a, -- "ab aeterno soivit Deus plura

147
enuntiabilia, sed taman illa plura scivit una cognitione"
14al4-15, 2lb55.

SE HABERE AD

To stand in relation to, to be raated to.

Frequently used to designate a relation, e.g., 13a56, 13bl, often
the dual relation expressed in a proportionality -- e.g., "inaequalitatem ••• quae

~habet

ad falaitatem sicut aequalitas ad

veritatem" 17b9.

SE TENERE EX PARTE

To be proper to, to pertain to.

"non taman realiter ab esse distinguuntur:

unde nee verum quod

appropriatur personae Filii ab esse quod !! tenet ex parte
essentiae" 4b25.

SECUNDUM QUID

In a certain respect.

In a certain restricted sense, according to a certain consideration;
SECUNDUM QUOD

opposed to "simpliciter loquendo"

23b9.

Insofar as, according as, inasmuch as.

Frequent in the work.

The phrase in "judicium intellectus est

de re secundum quod est" 2lbl8 can perhaps best be translated
"according to a thing's existence" or simply "as it is".
SECUNDUM REM

In nature, in reality.

Opposed to "ratione distinguuntur (4b29), equivalent to "non
differunt re" (4b20) -- "sint unum secundum rem" 4b33.
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SENSIBILIS, -E
a)

adj. and subst.

Sensible, able to be sensed.

In adjectival use,

capable of being known by sense cognition:

"sensibili re

praesente" 25b57, 6b47, "sensibiles qualitates" 23a34,
23b45, 25b57J
b)

substantively,
that which is primarily known by sense cognition:

"sensus

cognoscit sensibile" 22a4, 25b27, 28, 35, 41, 42, 48, 50,
26bl6.
Note.

The word never has the meaning of the English "sensible",

i.e., "possessed of good sense", nor the active meaning "able
to sense" -- of. SENSITIVUS.
SENSITIVUS, -A, -UM

Sensory, able to sense.

"sensitiva potentia" 22all, 25b39, "vis sensitiva" 25b41.
Sense.

SENSUS, -US
1.

Meaning:

(as in the phrase "the sense of this passage is ••• "

"cum. dicitur ••• accipitur secundum quod ••• ut sit sensus: ••• "
3b34.
2.

Sense power:

equivalent to "potentia sensitiva" (22all) or

"vis sensitiva"

(~5b41)

-- "sensus nihil cog;noscit nisi per

organum corp orale" 22a8;
a)

in general, and throughout the work except as herein

noted,
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the senses (collectively):

e.g., "cognitio nostra •••

incipiat in sensu" 25a29, usually with the implication
oi'

the senses precisely as in act:

practically equivale

to "sense knowledge", "sensation" -- e.g., "Utrum.
veritas sit in sensu" 2la48, 2lbl2, 57, "sensus sensibilium propriorum semper est varus" 26bl6;
b)

a particular sense power:

"quaedam vis sensitiva,

quae apprehendit speciam sensibilem sensibili re
praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b57, 26a3, 9, 53.
Note.

On the soundness of' st. Thomas's doctrine on the

action of' our sense powers in the i'ace of modern experimental and abnormal psychology, see, Ch. Boyer, "Reflexions sur la oonnaissance sensible salon saint Thomas",
Archives
SENTIO, -IRE

~

Philosophie, 1925, III, 2:

7-116.

To $anse, to know by sense.

"sensus cognoscit se sentire" 2lb38, 22a5.
SEQUOR, -I
1.

To follow.
To follow logically, to flow by logical necessity;

"ratio

non sequitur" 4bl0,_24a50.
2.

To follow, to be influenced by:

"illud quod est in aliquo

non sequitur illud in quo est, nisi quando causatur a principiis ejus; unde lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco,
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scilicet ex

sole~

sequitur motum solis magis quam aerem"

6a33-36.
SIGNIFICATIO~

Signification~

-IONIS

meaning.

Objectively~

that which is

si~ified,

the object of the signification:

"cum

dicitur, significatione non existente rectum est aliquid significari, verum est secundum ordinationem rerum in intellectu
divino" 15bl.
SIGNIFICO, -ARE
a)

To signify.

Representatively~

to mean, to signify:
propositionibus"

"res quae significatur illis tribus

l8a21~

"enuntiationi essentiale est ut

signifi c.et ill ud ad quod significandum est insti tuta" 18al-2,
3b30,
b)

33~

l8b2,

16b20~

23bl7, 24al4;

to manifest, to show forth:

"enuntiationis, quae intellectum

significat" 12b28, 7a36, 17a30.
SIGNUM, -I

Sign.

In this work,
manifestative (not representative) sign, external manifestation:
"enuntiatio est signum ·intellectus" 24b28, "signa divinae
voluntatis" 2la4.
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Likeness.

SIMILITUDO, -INIS
1.

Relation of similarity:

"similitudo propria invenitur in

utroque similium11 10al6, 25, 24a20, 21, 24, 33, 36, 39, 44,
48, 49, 57.
2.

Likeness, similitude, image:
a)

physical image:

"similitudo faciei in specula" 9al4,

10b4;
b)

likeness, mental image:

"in quantum per similitudinem

sui receptam in anima, cognitionem de se facit" 13b6,
6b44, 9b54.
Note.

The word "imago" does not appear in this work.

Con-

sequently, there is nothing of the careful distinction between
image and similitude found in later works, e.g., Summa Theologica
Ia, 93, 1.
Simply, in a primary and unqualified sense.

SIMPLICITER

"non simpliciter debet.enuntiari" 24a40, 9b32, 13b56, 2la22,
24b20; opposed to "secundum quid" -- 23b7.
SING1JLUM, -I

subst.

Single thing, individual.

"Deus ••• una cognitione cognoscit omnia ••• non singulis suwn
eognitionem immittens" .13a30.
Note.

This passage is not to be construed as meaning that God

does not know individuals.
place a

separate~

The import is that God does not

of cognition proper to each single thing.
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The "suam" is best taken as referring to "singulis" and not to
"Deus", as can happen even in classical Latin.
SPECIES, -EI

1.

Species.

As in logic,

kind, definite class, species:

"species coloris" 17a7,

"generatio ad hoc est ••• ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie"
14bl6.
2.

In the ontological order,
specific nature, for.m:

"ea quae sunt diversa specie ex parte

rerum" 10a50, "res ex ipsa specie quam habet, divino intellectui adaequatur 11 l3b2, 4, "vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente ••• apprehendit rem ut est" 25b56.
3.

In the mind,
representation, likeness, similitude:

"res non sunt in anima

per suam essentiam; sed per suam speciem" 4b52, 3a39, 9b47,
2la43;
equivalent to "similitudo" -- 5bl, 6b46.
SUBJECTD"M, -I

Subject.

That in which something inheres:

"accidens subjecto" 2b29,

"subjectum mutationis" 16bl6, 20b54, 56.
SUBSISTO, -ERE

To subsist.

To exist as a real being, to subsist:

"res ••• non subsistere
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possunt nisi per intelleetum divinum eas in esse producentem"
9a28.
Substance.

SUBSTANTIA, -AE
1.

In the logical order,
the notion or idea of substance:

"substantia non addit super

ens aliquam differentiam, quae significat aliquam naturam
superaddi tam enti 11 2b45.
2.

In the ontological order,
"sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus
essendi, scilicet per se ens" 2b46, "substantiae intellectuales" 2lb44, 22a2.
To underlie, to accompany.

SUBStJM, -ESSE
1.

To underlie, to be the subject of inherence:

"quando in

aliqua re apparent qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae
eis non subest" 22a40, 23a48.
2.

To accompany, to be mixed with:

11

creaturae, quamvis aliquam

Dei similitudinem gerant in seipsis, tamen maxima dissimilitude subest" 24a46.
Note.

"To be among" is allowed as a primary meaning of the

word in classical

~tin,

confirming the second meaning

assigned here.

SUM, ESSE

To be.

For the infinitive as a substantive, see ESSE.
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For the participle, see ENS.
The word is otherwise used as usual in Latin; in three occurrences the notion of aotual existence is strongly connoted -"quae in futurum. erunt, nunc autem

non~~~

12b34,

11

etiam

quando non est res ipsa" 12b38, 6a8.
Highest degree of, most perfect type of.
"in summa veritate sunt" 23a24.
SUPERADDO, -ERE

1.

To add.

In the logical order, equivalent to ADDO -- "veritas includit
in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinam
adaequationis ad intellectum" 20a42.

2.

In the ontological order -- ":naturam superadditam" 2b44.

SUPERIOR.a., -ORUM

Higher things, the heavenly bodies.

"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus sed
e converso" 26al2.

Se~

also INFERIORA, and MUNDUS MAJOR.
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TEMPUS, -ORIS

Time.

Time, point of time:

"anima ••• cointelligit tempus ••• diversimode

intelligit cursum Socratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et
futurum" 13al8.
Note.

No formal explanation or definition of time is given in

this work.

TERMING, -ARE

To terminate.

To reach a goal, to finish:

"motus autem cognitivae virtutis

terminatur ad animam" 5b3.
Note.

This expression must be taken as speaking of the act of

cognition entitatively, or psychologically, considered; terminatively, or epistemologically, it terminates in the object.

TERMINUS, -I
1.

Terminus,

Term.
stopping~point,

goal:

"complementum autem cujus-

libet motus est in suo ter.mino" 5b2.
2.

Member of a proposition, term:
cum terminos cognoscimus" 26bl2.

"principia, quae

cognosc~us
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u
Unity.

UNITAS, -ATIS
1.

The abstract of "unum",
unity, oneness:

"perfectior est unitas illius rei" 4bS9,

14bS9, 39, 24257.
2.

Concretely,
that which is one, a unity, a unit:

"existimaverunt corpus

esse unitatem ••• secundum hoc ergo corpus falsa unitas
dicitur" 24a56-24bl, 24a54, 24b4.
UNIVERSALE, -IS

subst.

Universal.

Universal nature, nature prescinded from individuals:

"non

dicitur universale incorruptibile, quasi habeat aliquam formam
incorruptionis" 14b45, "unde universale in rebus existens
dicitur corrumpi in hoc et in illo" 14b50.
Note.

The doctrine of universals is not formally treated in

this work, these passing references in answer to an objection
being the only occurrences.

ONUS, -A, -UM
a)

One.

As an adjective,
one, simple, incomposite:

"essentiam divinam, quae

~est"

15b26, 24a55;
the attribute which expresses a state of undividedness in a
thing --

"indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen 'unum•:
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nihil enim est aliud
"ens dicitur

~in

"ens, verum,

~,

~

quam ens indivisum" 3all-12,

quantum est indivisum in se" 3al9,

at bonum magis uniantur in Deo quam in

creaturis" 4b26, 36.
Note.

The usual scholastic definitions of "unum" give two

notes:

"indivisum in se 11 and "divisum a quolibet alio".

St. Thomas ascribes only the first to the term "unum",
reserving the other for the term "aliquid"; see ALIQUID, 1.
b)

In a more substantive use,
one thing, unit:

equivalent to UNITAS, 2, -- "cum in Deo

sint unum" 4b34, 32, 37, 38;
same one thing:

"unum,sine altaro intelligi potest" 3b45,

"unum non sit principium alterius" 18bl7.
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v
Word.

VERBUM, -I

1.

Word, saying:

"verbum Augustini est intelligendum ••• n l4al.

2.

The Word, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity:

in

article VII, "Utrum veritas in divinis personaliter vel
essentialiter dicitur" -- 19al9.
Truly.

VERE

Truly, with truth:

taman cognoscit veritatam,
Note.

~

"si enim sensus
qua~

The word here does not mean

judicat de rebus, non

judicat" 2lb35-37.
11

in the true sense of the

term", as is clear from "veritatem" (2lb37, 42).

Cf. Paul

Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von
Aquin:
~

Ein Beitrag zur Gesohiohte des Evidenzproblams", Beitr:'ge

Geschichte

~

Philosophie

~

Theologie des Mittelalters,

1931, XXX, 114-119.
VERITAS, -ATIS
1.

Truth.

Usually, and throughout the work (the word occurs over 420
times) except as noted below, nn. 2, 3, 4, 5,
truth in its full and for.mal sense:

"veritas est adaequatio

rei et intellectusi• 3b7 (on whether this is really the
definition of Isaac Israeli, of. ISAAC, Note s.v.);
properly in the intellect rather than in the object -- "reducitur ad veritatem simpliciter, quae est in intelleotu"
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2la22, as is clear from the whole of article II, "Utrum
veritas principalius inveniatur in intellectu quam in
rebus", which is summarized by st. Thomas at the beginning
of the body of article IV,

11

Respondeo dicendum quod sicut

ex praedictis, art. 2, patet, veritas propria invenitur in
intellectu huma.no vel divino, sicut sanitas in animali"
8b54-57.
a)

Primarily in the Divine Intellect, as is clear from
article IV, "Utrum sit una tantum veri tas qua onmia
sint vera" and article VIII, "Utrum omnis veritas
sit a veritate prima".

The truth of God's mind is
veritas aeterna 11

11

called "prima veritas" art. VIII,

12b43, "veritas prima at aeterna" 15b20, "veritas
extrinseca (i.e., rebus]" 12b21,

11

veritas ••• in

intellectu divino" l4a42, "veritas immutabilis 11
art. VI, 17al5;
b)

secondarily, but still "propria" (8b55) in the human
mind -- "Est ergo in intellactu divino quidem veritas
propria at prius, in intellectu vero humano propria
quidem et secundario" 9a5-8;
i)

in t4e intellect, formally and strictly in the

judgment -- "per prius invenitur in actu intelleotus oomponentis at dividentis quam in
actu intelleotus quidditates rerum formantis"
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(6b3l-34), "veritas per prius invenitur in
compositions et divisions intellectus; secundario autam ••• et per posterius in intellectu
formants definitiones" 7a4, 7a21-25;
ii)

and, though not formally, in sense perceptions,
especially in the sense judgment (of.
APPREHENSIO, JUDICIUM, 2, and JUDICO, 2) -"Sed veritas est in sensu siout oonsequens
aotum ejus; dum scilicet judicium sensus est
de re secundum quod est; sed taman non est in
sensu siout cognita a sensu:

si enim sensus

vera judicat de rebus, non taman cognoscit
veritatam qua vera judioat" 2lb3l-37.
2.

Improperly, i.e., analogously,
ontological truth, the truth of things:

11

veritas ••• in rebus

autem improprie at secundario" 9a8, by extrinsic denomination -- "veritas improprie dicta ••• Denominantur autem res
verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano, sieut denaminatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae
est in animali" 9a54-9bl, 9al-5;
called "veritas inhaarens" l2b20, 45, 17a21, described as
"veritas ••• quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil est alius quam
entitas intellectui adaequata vel intelleotum sibi adaequans" 9b3-5, "veritas rerum existentium includit in sui
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ratione

entitat~

earum, et superaddit habitudinam ad intel-

leotum humanum vel divinum" 20a40-44; 3a51, 3bl, 4al5, 5b33,
6a45, 9al8, 19, 25, 31, 51, 53, 54, 9b2, 24, 37, 42, 10a30,
46, 12b26, 44, 13b21, 24, 54, 55, 14a32, 15b43, 17al0, 27,
28, 33, 35, 36, 37, 43, 17b38, 18a3, 10, 18b44, 47, 50, 53,
20a53, 54, 20b2, 10, 40, 44, 45, 52, 24al;
a)

primarily of the relation of things to God's intellect
-- "Per prius etiam inest rei veritas per comparationem ad intellectum di vinum quam humanum." 9a31,
"veritas quae dicitur de eis in comparatione ad intellectum. divinum eis inseparabiliter communicatur"
9a25;

b)

secondarily, of the relation of things to the human
intellect -- "veritas autam quae dicitur de rebus in
comparatione ad intellectum humanum est rebus quodammodo accidentalis" 9al9.

3.

Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect
-- "voces autam eodem modo recipiunt veritatis praedioationem, sicut intelleotus quos significant" 7a34
(of. INTELLECTUS, 2, a).

4.

Moral truth, veracity:

"veritas quae est in confessionibus

in judicio faoiendis" 14b5.
5.

Dialectically, in a non-committal manner, in the title of
the question, in the titles of the various articles, e.g.,
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"Quid sit veritas", in the objections or preliminary arguments, and in the following places -- 3a50, 51, 52, 55,
3bl7, 4al9, l3a37, 56, l3b36, 57, 14a37, 14b5, l6b20, 22,
27, 17a21, 22, 24, 25, 18al2, l8b3, 53, 25a35.
Note.

The notion of "veritas" in st. Thomas has been the subject

of extensive study, for example, Blaise Romeyer, "La doctrine de
v~rit'"• Archives~

saint Thomas sur la
2:

Philosophie, 1925, III,

1-54; Paul Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei

Thomas von Aquin:

Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Evidenz-

problems~, Beitr~ge ~ Gesohichte ~ Philosophie ~ Theologie

des Mittelalters, 1931, XXX, 1-214; Cardinal D. Mercier, "La
notion de la v6rit'"• Revue N'o-Soholastique, 1899, VI, 371-403;
Joseph de Tonqu,dec,
11

La question de la

~

Critique de

v'rit~"

~

Connaissance, Chapitre VI,

219-246, esp. note 2, P• 239, and

Appendice VIII, "Commentaire des trois premiers articles de la
question I de Veritate", 508·518.
F'or further readings see the Introduction and the General
Bibliography of the present study.
VERUS, •A, -UM

Note.

True.

This word is used over 340 times in the work, with the

same variations of meanings and use as VERITAS, q.v.

It ex-

presses the concrete attribute of which VERITAS is the abstract,
and st. Thomas in his own usage often makes one definition do
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tor both, e.g., "convenientiam vero antis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen 'verum• ••• quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dioitur, at in hoc formaliter ratio veri
parfioitur" 3a33-45.

He likewise affixes both VERITAS and VERUM

to the same set of divisions, e.g., "Secundum hoc ergo triplicite
veritas et verum definiri invenitur" 3a52•53.

This equating of

the two even when he is laying down formal definitions, and not
merely in a passing reference, suggests that the divisions and
remarks laid down under VERITAS will hold here also.
Furthermore, this close parallel suggests a point which is
brought out by a study of the actual uses of the word, namely
that he often uses VERUM as a substantive

~d

in a quasi-abstract

sense, as the equivalent of VERITAS, e.g., 5b22, 6b34, 7a6, 22,
20bl7, 23, 23b24, 29, 24all, 20, 24b24.

However, it is used

substantively in a concrete sense in 4a47, 5a38, 9a49, 53, 12b45,
51 to denote that which is true, a true thing.
1.

Usually, and throughout the work except as otherwise noted
herein,
true:

"veri ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intel-

leotus" 6b35, 3a33, 45;
a)

primarily

~d

most properly said of intellect,

especially in the judgment -- "veritas per prius invenitur in compositions et divisions intellectus;
seoundario autem et per posterius dioitur verum in
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intellectu rormante definitiones" 7a22, "quando
adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium
verum esse" 6b52;
b)

but also, though less formally, or sense, particularly
sense judgment -- "et sic dicitur esse sensus ralsus
vel verus ••• sensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis
semper est verum" 25a41-48, "sensus sensibilium
propriorum semper est varus" 26bl6.

2.

]mproperly, i.e., analogously,
ontologically true, conformed or conformable to some intellect:

"verum ••• dicitur ••• tertio de rebus, secundum quod

adaequantur intellectui divino, vel aptae natae sunt adaequ ·
intellectui humano" 7a26-29, "si autam aocipiatur veritas ·
improprie dicta, secundum quam omnia dicuntur

~n

9a52,

"denominantur res verae a veritate quae est intellectu divino
vel in intellectu humano" 9a54-9bl, "res autem non dioitur
vera nisi secundum quod est intellectui adaequata; unde per
posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu" 5b20-23;
even said or non-beings -- "quamvis istum rornicari sit
malum, tamen ••• nat~ est oontormari intellectui, et secundum
hoc.consequitur
a)

ratio~"

4a56-4b2, 20b31, 34, 37;

prinarily,
conformed to the Divine Intellect:

"res aliqua prin-
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cipalius dicitur
lectus divini

~

qu~

in ordine ad veritatem intel-

in ordine ad veritatem intellectus

humani" 9a38, 42, 43, "res ••• secundum adaequationem
ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera" 5b48;
b)

secondarily,
conformable to a created intellecta

"secundum autem

adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res
~·

in quantum nata est de se formare veram

aestimationam" 5b56, "Et ideo in definitions rei
verae potest poni visio in actu intellectus divini,
non autem visio intellectus humani nisi in potentia"
6a54.
3.

Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect
"enuntiatio

~

dicitur" 13a51, 13b21, 14a7, 15b2, 17b41,

47, "orationum suarum verarum" 7a31.
4.

Morally true, veracious:

"verum--dicitur ••• quarto de homine,

qui est electivus orationum suarum" 7a22.
5.

Dialectically, as VERITAS, 3, in the preliminary arguments,
etc., and in 20b30.
Virtue, power.

VIRTUS, -UTIS
1.

Technically, as a species of habit,
virtue:

2.

"justitia ••• quia virtus ••• est habitus" 14a50, 53.

Operative power:

equivalent to POTENTIA, 2(q.v., especially

the Note, s.v.), and VIS --"virtus cognitiva" 5b3, 23b54.
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3.

Power, force:

"res ••• ex virtute ejusdem speciei nata est

sibi intellectum nostrum adaequare" 13b4, 7bll.

VIS,

Power.
Operative po:wer:

n.!!!.

equivalent to POTE1TTIA, 2, and VIRTUS, 2

cog;nitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "vis sensitiva" 25b41,

"vis apprehensiva" 25b55.
Cogitative power, particular reason,

VIS COGITATIV.A

comparative sense.
The internal sense power in man which corresponds to "vis
aestimativa" in brute animals, called "comparative" because it
operates "per quamdam collationem", called "particular reason"
because it is the special instrument of the intellect in our
knowledge of singulars:

"sensus judicat ••• de quibusdam autem

quasi per quamdam collationem, quam tacit in homine
~·

~

cogita-

quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cujus in aliis

animalibus est existimatio naturalis; et sic judicat vis
sensitiva de sensibilibus oommunibus et de sensibilibus per
accidens" 25b36-43.

Cf. De Veritate X, 5 corp., ad 2um, ad 4um;

Summa Theologioa, Ia, 78, 4; Rudolf Allers, "The Intellectual
Cognition of

Particular~", ~

Thomist, 1941, III, 1:

96-163;

Julien Peghaire, •A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, According
to St. Thomas", The Modern Schoolman, 1943, XX, 123-140, 210-229.
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VISIO, -IONIS

Vision, knowledge.

Metaphorically, of intellect,
cognition, knowledge:

"visio intellectus humani" 6a44, 54, 55.

Sight.

VISUS, -US

The external sense power of.vision, sight:

"visus ••• cognosoit

oolorem" 3a38.
Word.

VOX, VOCIS
11

voces ••• intellectus quos significant" 7a33.

VOLlJNTAS, -ATIS

Will.

a)

"voluntas divina" 2la5, 6, 7;

b)

state of will, habit:

"justitia est constans et perpetua

voluntas uniouique jus suum tribuens" 14b2.
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